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DISCLOSING "POLITICAL" OVERSIGHT OF
AGENCY DECISION MAKING
Nina A. Mendelson*
Scholars and courts have divided views on whether presidential su-
pervision enhances the legitimacy of the administrative state. For
some, that the President can supervise administrative agencies is
key to seeing agency action as legitimate, because of the President's
accountability to the electorate. Others, however, have argued that
such supervision may simply taint, rather than legitimate, an
agency action.
The reality is that presidential supervision of agency rulemaking, at
least, appears to be both significant and opaque. This Article pre-
sents evidence from multiple presidential administrations
suggesting that regulatory review conducted by the White House's
Office of Management and Budget is associated with high levels of
changes in agency rules. Further, this Article documents the com-
parative silence regarding the effect of that supervision. The Office
of Management and Budget and the agencies generally do not re-
port the content of supervision by presidential offices. They also do
not report whether a particular agency decision is consistent with
presidential preferences. Silence about content, this Article sug-
gests, threatens to undermine the promise of presidential influence
as a source of legitimacy for the administrative state.
This Article then argues for greater transparency. Agencies should
be required to summarize executive influence on significant rule-
making decisions. Such an ex ante disclosure regime is superior to
proposals that judges be more receptive to political reasons in re-
viewing a particular agency action. Finally, this Article suggests
that while some, but not all, political reasons for agency action are
legitimate, only a more transparent system-one that facilitates
public dialogue and accountability to Congress-can fully resolve
the question of which reasons are legitimate and which are not.
* Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School. For useful comments and discus-
sion, I am very grateful to Cynthia Farina, Rob Glicksman, Don Herzog, Riyaz Kanji, Ellen Katz,
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Rachlinski, Jodi Short, Peter Strauss, and participants in workshops at Cornell Law School, the
University of Kansas Law School, the University of Michigan Law School, and the University of
Chicago Law School. Thanks also go to Chris Kriva for terrific research assistance. Financial sup-
port for this project came from the Elkes and Cook Funds at the University of Michigan Law
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INTRODUCTION
In the last few decades, scholars and judges have relied heavily on the
presence of presidential supervision to lend legitimacy to executive branch
agency action.' Executive branch agencies now possess considerable discre-
tion to decide questions of value, such as how much risk government action
should aim to address and how to balance economic costs against, say,
safety or environmental protection. These aspects of agency decision mak-
ing are generally not closely constrained by statute. And since they are not
closely constrained by statute, they also may not be readily subject to other
tools of accountability, such as rigorous judicial review.' In theory, presiden-
tial supervision can partially fill this gap by supplying political
accountability. Further, anecdotal information suggests that executive super-
vision can have discernible effects on this type of agency decision.
Despite the claim of President-centered theories that such supervision
can be an important source of agency accountability, agencies rarely, if ever,
mention what might be termed political reasons in their decisions, particu-
larly their rulemaking decisions
By "political reasons," I mean reasons communicated from a particular
source (rather than reasons with a particular content). "Political reasons" in
this Article are those contributed by or adhered to by the President and the
politically-appointed executive officials who oversee the administrative
process and who answer most closely to the President. While views of
members of Congress could also count as "political reasons," I plan to focus
on executive views. And in so doing, I am assuming that the views of White
House officials entrusted with regulatory oversight, although they are not
1. See infra text accompanying notes 46-48.
2. As long as agencies have considered "relevant factors" under a statute, courts rarely go
much further in inspecting the rationale of an agency decision. Cf Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp.
v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519 (1978) (giving deference to agency decision with
regard to procedure where agency considered "relevant factors").
3. See infra text accompanying notes 145-160.
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elected, and although the views may not be perfectly refined or channeled,
are highly likely to reflect the President's positions .4 So, for example, an
agency deciding that the environment should get the edge over economic
costs or that more immediate motor vehicle safety should yield to a desire
for greater manufacturing flexibility, will not generally mention whether, or
to what extent, its decision reflects or has been influenced by presidential
views. Nor will the decision generally describe the content of those views,
even though presidential preferences and the weighing of the relevant con-
siderations by presidential advisors may frequently figure into the decision,
particularly through the regulatory review process.
There are two strains in the literature regarding executive influence on
agency decision making. Consistent with President-centered theories, many
academics and judges argue that agency decisions are normatively better
due to this influence, and indeed, that some sort of presidential supervision
is necessary to the legitimacy of executive branch agencies because it repre-
sents a mechanism of electoral accountability
In some tension with this position, others have argued that an agency
policy choice at the President's direction may not be particularly defensible
and may even be outright tainted-a "source of danger rather than of ac-
countability." Jody Freeman and Adrian Vermeule recently argued that the
Supreme Court may be increasingly concerned with "protect[ing] adminis-
trative expertise from political intrusion," at least at times of alleged
"widespread tampering" with an agency decision-making process . Some,
including Thomas McGarity, have argued that agency decision making
should be carefully insulated from presidential supervision, which might
cause agencies to make decisions that are inappropriate, or worse.'
As a means of encouraging agencies to rely more explicitly on political
reasons, including those coming from executive supervision, three scholars
have suggested that judges should be more receptive to "politics" as they
review agency decisions under the Administrative Procedure Act's "arbitrary
4. See CURTIS W. COPELAND, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., FEDERAL RULEMAKING: THE ROLE
OF THE OFFICE OF INFORMATION AND REGULATORY AFFAIRS, Summary (2009) ("[OIRA] is part of
the Executive Office of the President, and helps ensure that covered agencies' rules reflect the Presi-
dent's policies and priorities."); Lisa Schultz Bressman & Michael P. Vandenbergh, Inside the
Administrative State: A Critical Look at the Practice of Presidential Control, 105 MICH. L. REV. 47,
65-69 (2006) (discussing the O1RA's influence, as well as that of other White House offices); see
also Peter L. Strauss, Overseer, or "The Decider"? The President in Administrative Law, 75 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 696, 714-15 (2007) (discussing possibility that White House guidance can be "con-
flicting, not unidirectional").
5. See infra text accompanying notes 46-48.
6. Jody Freeman & Adrian Vermeule, Massachusetts v EPA: From Politics to Expertise,
2007 SuP. CT. REv. 51, 88 (describing this as an inference that can be drawn from the Supreme
Court's State Farm decision).
7. Id. at 54-55.
8. E.g., Thomas 0. McGarity, Presidential Control of Regulatory Agency Decisionmaking,
36 AM. U. L. REv. 443 (1987) (arguing that Congress can and should enact stringent limitations on
presidential influence on informal rulemaking).
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and capricious" standard.9 Christopher Edley, Dean of the University of
California at Berkeley School of Law (Boalt Hall), has suggested that, in
practice, courts "credit politics as an acceptable and even desirable element
of decision making."' Former Harvard Law School Dean Elena Kagan has
suggested that courts "relax the rigors of hard look review" if there is de-
monstrable evidence of presidential involvement in the administrative
decision at hand." Most recently, Kathryn Watts has also advocated for judi-
cial acceptance of political reasons if such reasons reinforce "accountability,
public participation, and representativeness.' 2 Among other things, these
commentators hope that greater judicial willingness to credit political con-
siderations as legitimate will eliminate an obstacle to an agency's disclosure
of those considerations and prompt greater (or more visible) presidential
supervision of agency action.
This Article seeks to make some fairly simple points against the back-
drop of the literature on presidential control of agencies. I first suggest that
presidential, or executive, influence on an agency decision is not clearly
good or bad. It can potentially be seen as either increasing or decreasing the
legitimacy of an agency's decision depending on the content of the
influence.
Second, I offer some current evidence both of an apparently significant
level of White House influence on agency rules and of silence regarding the
content of that influence, from both agencies and the Office of Management
and Budget ("OMB"). Silence about content, I suggest, threatens to under-
mine the promise of presidential influence as a source of legitimacy for the
administrative state.
Third, rather than addressing the issue indirectly through judicial review,
I suggest that we proceed directly to regulating procedure. We should re-
quire that a significant agency rule include at least a summary of the
substance of executive supervision. Requiring greater transparency in the
agency decision-making process may not only increase accountability for
agency action, but also help to deter inappropriate presidential influence and
prompt Congress to refine statutory requirements if appropriate. Judges
9. The Administrative Procedure Act provides broadly for judicial review of an agency's
"action." 5 U.S.C. § 704 (2006) ("Agency action made reviewable by statute and final agency action
for which there is no other adequate remedy in a court are subject to judicial review."). In most
cases, however, judicial review is limited to determining whether an agency's action is "arbitrary,
capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law." 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A)
(2006).
10. CHRISTOPHER F. EDLEY, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: RETHINKING JUDICIAL CONTROL OF
BUREAUCRACY 192 (1990).
11. Elena Kagan, PresidentialAdministration, 114 HARv. L. REV. 2245, 2380 (2001).
12. Kathryn A. Watts, Proposing a Place for Politics in Arbitrary and Capricious Review,
119 YALE L.J. 2, 83 (2009). Similar to the proposal made here, Margaret Gilhooley has also pro-
posed ex ante disclosure of executive oversight, on the grounds that there would be "greater
accountability to Congress and the public for the explanation" and for the agency's "accept[ance of]
an administration position as an agency policy," as well as a "safeguard that the agency has exer-
cised independent judgment." See Margaret Gilhooley, Executive Oversight of Administrative
Rulemaking: Disclosing the Impact, 25 IND. L. REV. 299, 333 (1991).
1130 [Vol. 108:1127
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could enforce disclosure requirements. In reviewing the decision under an
arbitrary and capricious review standard, however, judges could be deferen-
tial regarding political reasons offered by the agency. Again, that would
depend on the content of the reasons. A Department of Transportation
("DOT") automotive fuel economy rulemaking finalized in March 2009 may
be a potential model.
13
Fourth, requiring disclosure is superior to proposals solely aimed at
modifying judicial review. Because expertise-focused judicial review is not
the only obstacle to disclosing political supervision, adjusting judicial re-
view is unlikely to significantly increase the transparency of agency
decision making. Moreover, a number of such proposals place an inappro-
priate burden on the judiciary to distinguish good and bad political reasons.
Requiring disclosure would instead be aimed at engaging the public and
Congress regarding the appropriateness of particular reasons and of execu-
tive supervision in agency decisions.
Finally, I offer some preliminary thoughts on political reasons and
discuss the sorts of political reasons that might taint or improve the quality
of an agency decision. I conclude that any discussion of political reasons
cannot be finally resolved without improving the transparency of the deci-
sion-making process. Such an enhanced process is likely to be our best
method to realize the promise of accountability for agency action and for
identifying and distinguishing good political reasons from bad ones.
I. THE PRESIDENT AND EXECUTIVE BRANCH AGENCIES
The role of the President in agency rulemaking may be viewed as raising
two distinct, though interrelated, questions. Briefly, these include, first, the
extent of the President's legal authority to oversee agency rulemaking, and
second, the extent to which executive supervision might affect the legiti-
macy of agency action. That second question may be subdivided further
(though the categories are not entirely distinct) into whether presidential
oversight enhances democratic responsiveness and whether oversight affects
accountability for a particular agency decision, including in the courts.
To clarify briefly, my primary focus here is on agency rulemaking, in-
cluding both interpretive rules and legislative rules, since these decisions as
a group are far-reaching and are broadly framed. Agency rules are also gen-
erally subject to executive review, thus providing us with some information
on how executive review has proceeded to date. Agency adjudication is be-
yond the scope of this Article.
Commentators and courts largely agree that the President can legally be
involved in agency decisions such as rulemaking. From a constitutional
standpoint, the "executive Power" is vested in the President, 4 she is author-
ized to "require the Opinion, in writing, of the principal Officer in each of
13. See infra text accompanying notes 167-170.
14. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1, cl. 1.
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the executive Departments,"'5 and she is to "take Care" that the laws be
faithfully executed. 16 This implies some authority to oversee agency action.
Goldsmith and Manning have recently argued that these constitutional
clauses and others imply not only the power of the President to oversee
agency action, but also, somewhat controversially, a default presidential
"completion power" to go beyond (though not against) statutory prescrip-
tions." They also suggest, however, that Congress is free to limit the scope
of any such presidential completion power."
Beyond this, unitary executive theorists also argue that Article II of the
Constitution might be read to entitle the President to control-or even to
make decisions for-executive branch and independent agencies.' 9 With
respect to executive branch agencies, Congress sometimes delegates rule-
making authority to the "Administrator" or "Secretary" rather than to the
"President," for example, raising the question whether Congress's intent is
to insulate decisions made by the agency official from executive supervi-
sion. Unitary executive theory adherents might suggest that the Constitution
bars such a reading of a statute.
In many cases, however, the question whether presidential oversight of
administrative agencies is constitutionally required, or contemplated as a
default constitutional rule, and whether executive supervision raises statu-
tory questions, ought to be put aside. As Kagan has convincingly argued,
statutory delegations to executive branch agencies should be read to include
15. U.S. CONST. art. H, § 2, cl. 1.
16. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3, cl. 4.
17. Jack Goldsmith & John F. Manning, The President's Completion Power, 115 YALE L.J.
2280, 2297 (2006) ("[T]he executive branch has exercised an ambitious program of regulatory su-
pervision that is a clear example of the President's completion power....").
18. Id. at 2282 ("It is a defeasible power; Congress can limit it, for example .... by specify-
ing the manner in which a statute must be implemented."). Sharp disagreement persists on
Goldsmith and Manning's theory. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of
Deference: Supreme Court Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations from Chevron to Hamdan,
96 GEO. L.J. 1083, 1166 (2008) (finding Goldsmith and Manning's theory unpersuasive); Harold
Hongju Koh, Setting the World Right, 115 YALE L.J. 2350, 2368-70 (2006) (challenging constitu-
tional underpinnings of Goldsmith and Manning's arguments); see also Kevin M. Stack, The
President's Statutory Powers to Administer the Laws, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 263 (2006) (arguing that
errors in use of completion power would be very difficult to fix).
19. E.g., Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President's Power To Execute the
Laws, 104 YALE L.J. 541, 570-99 (1994) (detailing the textual argument for the unitary executive);
Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The President and the Administration, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1,
3 (1994) (analyzing both a historical and constitutional basis for the unitary executive). Contra
Robert V. Percival, Presidential Management of the Administrative State: The Not-So-Unitary Ex-
ecutive, 51 DUKE L.J. 963 (2001) (arguing that the President does not have unitary executive
powers). On the Opinions Clause in particular, compare Peter L. Strauss, Presidential Rulemaking,
72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 965, 979-80 (1997) (arguing that the Opinions Clause contemolates presi-
dential involvement in agency decision making), with McGarity, supra note 8, at 480 (arguing that
the Opinions Clause represents, at most, a "paperwork requirement for presidential monitoring of
bureaucratic thinking"), and Strauss, supra note 4, at 703 (noting that some have concluded that the
opinions clause suggests "constitutional obligations not only to oversee [agency officials] but also to
respect their independent exercise of those duties").
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at least a delegation of oversight authority to the President in light of Con-
20gress's awareness of a longstanding pattern of executive supervision.
For purposes of this discussion, I follow Kagan's arguments that statutes
generally permit presidential oversight of executive agency decision mak-
ing. I note in passing Peter Strauss's argument that such statutes delegating
authority directly to an agency official should not be read to permit the
President, even as Chief Executive, to exceed the role of an "overseer" and
become a "decider."2' Strauss of course notes that a President's primary for-
mal recourse against a recalcitrant executive agency official remains
removal from office, irrespective whether the President is acting as overseer
or as decider. He nonetheless argues that mischaracterizing the President's
role as "decider" might prompt an agency official to discount the agency's
own independent decision-making process and, within statutory bounds, feel
committed to follow the President's instructions.22 As I discuss in greater
detail below, greater disclosure of political reasons may help illuminate the
actual nature of executive supervision and the extent to which agency offi-
cials buck executive supervision or feel unquestioning obedience to the
President's requirements. 2' That in turn may prompt Congress, at the time it
delegates authority to an agency, to be more specific about the level of ex-
ecutive supervision it finds acceptable.
This brings us to the second question raised by executive supervision of
agency rulemaking. Assuming that some level of oversight is consistent with
20. See Kagan, supra note 11, at 2326-35 (arguing that congressional delegation of authority
to agencies is against backdrop and knowledge of presidential administration, and that interpretation
is consistent with best reading of statute); id. at 2329-30 (inference to be drawn from delegation to
"President" is that President has latitude to choose which agency official will receive subdelegation).
But see Stack, supra note 18 (arguing that negative inferences should be drawn from statutory fail-
ure to mention the President by name). Although Stack presents delegations in which Congress
specifically mentioned a presidential role as a contrast to those in which only an agency was men-
tioned, my view is that members of Congress are more likely to be aware of the general fact of
executive supervision than sensitive to the precise words that might be used to draft a particular
agency delegation. An alternative interpretation of Congress's decision to use the word "President"
in a delegation, for example, is simply that it wishes to authorize the President to select which ex-
ecutive branch agency is the most appropriate implementer of a statute. For example, consider the
climate change-related controversy in Congress in 2009 over whether the EPA or the USDA should
be designated to run part of a climate change program. Agriculture groups wanted the USDA to run
the program; environmentalists preferred the EPA. The Senate bill deferred by delegating authority
to the President, with the understanding that the President would be responsible for assigning im-
plementation responsibilities to the agencies. See Alison Winter, Kerrn-Boxer proposal leaves
question markforforestrv groups, ENV'T & ENERGY DAILY, Oct. 2, 2009, http://www.eenews.net/
public/EEDaily/2009/10/02/2 ("The new Senate text gives the president jurisdiction over the poten-
tial program, rather than defining clear roles for USDA and U.S. EPA."). What Kagan's arguments
do not resolve, however, is how far this presidential influence could extend-such as whether a
President could sign a proposed rule in the Federal Register over the objection of a reluctant admin-
istrator.
21. See Strauss, supra note 4, at 704-05 (arguing that "overseer" function is commensurate
with presidential obligations and responsibilities as Chief Executive).
22. See id. at 704 ("The subordinate's understanding of [whether ordinary respect and politi-
cal deference or law-compelled obedience] is owed, and what is her personal responsibility, has
implications for what it means to have a government under laws."). Strauss describes a couple of
cases in which agency heads have resisted presidential "direction." Id. at 736.
23. See infra Section IV.B. 1.
1133May 20 10]
HeinOnline  -- 108 Mich. L. Rev. 1133 2009-2010
Michigan Law Review
both the Constitution and the terms of an agency's statutory delegation, to
what extent might supervision by the President enhance the legitimacy of
agency actions? As I have discussed in greater detail elsewhere, that inquiry
may be broken down into whether agencies are accountable and democrati-
cally responsive; both are relevant to whether an agency is likely to be
perceived as legitimate.24
An agency may be accountable if its authority is limited by meaningful
constraints, and if it is obligated to disclose and justify its actions-and to
suffer consequences--on the basis of its explanation or performance.25 As
Lisa Bressman and Peter Strauss have both recently argued in detail, permit-
ting or encouraging administrative discretion in a form that is "'legally
uncontrollable' , 6 raises legitimacy issues, possibly at least as significant as
those raised by assigning policy questions to an institution that is not de-
mocratically responsive.27 Judicial review of agency action, for example,
could serve as an important safeguard against such arbitrariness and protect
these rule-of-law values. Further, the electoral process can be a potential
source of accountability, to the extent that the decision of voters to elect a
new President or new members of Congress is linked to a change in agency
oversight and conduct.
If an agency is electorally accountable, the agency might also be said to
be democratically responsive, because the availability of electoral recourse
is an incentive for the agency to respond to popular preferences. On another
procedural view of "democratic responsiveness," an agency decision might
be described as democratic to the extent the agency engages in a deliberative
process and offers reasons to the public in support of its decision, so that the
public can be engaged in a discussion about what approach best serves soci-
ety.2s Finally, an agency's decision might be judged as democratic based onits substantive content-perhaps, consistent with pluralism theories, the de-
24. See Nina A. Mendelson, Agency Burrowing: Entrenching Policies and Personnel Before
a New President Arrives, 78 N.YU. L. REV. 557, 577 (2003).
25. See id.; Edward Rubin, The Myth of Accountability and the Anti-administrative Impulse,
103 MICH. L. REV. 2073, 2119 (2005) (offering definition of accountability and arguing, among
other things, that elections cannot assure administrative agency accountability).
26. Strauss, supra note 4, at 704 (quoting EDWARD S. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT: OFFICE AND
POWERS 1787-1957, at 80-81 (4th rev. ed. 1957)).
27. See Lisa Schultz Bressman, Beyond Accountability: Arbitrariness and Legitimacy in the
Administrative State, 78 N.YU. L. REV. 461, 463-64 (2003) ("The presidential control model mis-
leads us into thinking that [political] accountability is all we need to assure ourselves that agency
action is constitutionally valid .... I suggest that a focus on the avoidance of arbitrary agency deci-
sionmaking lies at the core of ... a theoretical justification of administrative legitimacy ... ");
Strauss, supra note 4, at 704 (suggesting that the risk of a "'legally uncontrollable"' branch of
government must be addressed because of its implications for "what it means to have a government
under laws"); see also Kevin M. Stack, The Constitutional Foundations of Chenery, 116 YALE L.J.
952, 996 (2007) (arguing that nondelegation doctrine promotes core "rule of law" values such as
protection against "arbitrary agency decision-making and [promoting] regularity, rationality, and
transparency").
28. See, e.g., AMY GUTMANN & DENNIS THOMPSON, DEMOCRACY AND DISAGREEMENT 16,
40-41, 137 (1996) (describing procedural democracy as ensuring accountability for policies and
results). Gutmann and Thompson further argue that democracy requires a deliberative process en-
gaging both the decision-making institution and citizens. Id. at 12-13.
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cision might be seen as legitimate because it reconciles the preferences of
most voters.
Given the need to consider accountability and democratic considera-
tions, how might presidential supervision enhance legitimacy? Presidential
supervision clearly can make pragmatic contributions to agency decision
making. A President can ensure that decision making among multiple fed-
eral agencies is coordinated. 29 A President can provide direction and energy
to agency officials.3" And centralized presidential supervision can counteract
the tendency of an agency to take a "tunnel vision" approach by bringing a
broad perspective to agency prioritization and decision making.3'
These are surely valuable contributions, and some administrative law
theorists have gone further, arguing that under current law, presidential su-
pervision is a central source of legitimacy for actions taken by the
administrative state because it can increase the democratic accountability of
32key government decisions through the electoral process.
These arguments take account of two current realities regarding the
delegation of administrative authority. First, Congress regularly delegates
broadly to agencies, with minimal statutory constraints on even the most
important administrative decisions. Agency powers typically include the
discretion to set far-ranging and expensive regulatory standards. Second,
although agencies were originally conceptualized as institutions filled with
technocratic experts finding objective answers to technical questions posed
by Congress,33 the significant issues agencies must resolve very often in-
clude questions of "value."' 34 Even an agency's interpretation of ambiguous
statutory language can require the evaluation of policy or other value-laden
issues.
For example, the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act calls on
the DOT to regulate "unreasonable risk" presented by motor vehicles,35
while under the Clean Air Act, the Environmental Protection Agency
("EPA") sets national air quality standards "requisite to protect the public
29. E.g., Bressman, supra note 27, at 486.
30. Kagan, supra note 11, at 2339-40.
31. Bressman, supra note 27, at 506.
32. E.g., Cynthia R. Farina, The Consent of the Governed: Against Simple Rules for a Com-
plex World, 72 CHI-KENT L. REV. 987, 988 (1997) (noting that scholars and the judiciary have
looked to the President to "supply the elusive essence of democratic legitimation").
33. See JERRY L. MASHAW, GREED, CHAOS AND GOVERNANCE: USING PUBLIC CHOICE TO
IMPROVE PUBLIC LAw 111 (1997) (describing a view of the administrative state as a "well-ordered
input/output machine"); Bressman, supra note 27, at 479-80 (suggesting that the technocratic view
of agency decision making argues that technical expertise would provide protection against arbitrary
decision making); Gerald E. Frug, The Ideology of Bureaucracy in American Law, 97 HAtv. L. REV.
1276, 1282-83 (1984); Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88
HARV. L. REV. 1667, 1675-76 (1975).
34. E.g., Lloyd N. Cutler & David R. Johnson, Regulation and the Political Process, 84
YALE L.J. 1395, 1399 (1975) (asserting that regulatory agencies are heavily involved in "'political'
decisions in the highest sense of that term").
35. National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-563, 80 Stat. 718
(repealed 1994).
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health" with "an adequate margin of safety. 36 And the Energy Policy and
Conservation Act's automotive fuel economy standards provisions require
the Secretary of Transportation to set standards in light not only of techno-
logical feasibility, but also "economic practicability," and "the need of the
United States to conserve energy," raising a host of policy issues."
Deciding whether a risk is "unreasonable" or what margin of safety is
"adequate" of course will involve an assessment of the level of risk pre-
sented by an air pollutant or a car. These decisions also include a
judgment-implicit or explicit-regarding what level of risk is worth eradi-
cating or tolerable to the American public. Similarly, considering "economic
practicability" essentially requires a judgment about the level of cost that is
tolerable by a particular industry or by consumers. During the Ford Admini-
stration, the DOT famously considered these sorts of issues in a several-
hour-long public hearing on passive automobile restraints. Among other
things, Transportation Secretary Coleman heard comments (though they
were not ultimately reflected in the final, Reagan-era rule38) on whether
there were limits "to public acceptance of government action to increase
individual safety" and heard discussion on the extent to which auto safety
would increase if passengers simply took responsibility for buckling up their
own seatbelts.39
Similarly, in the context of interpretation, agencies must often confront
value issues identified by statute. For example, as discussed in greater detail
below, the Interior Department's Office of Surface Mining had to interpret
the ambiguous statutory phrase "surface coal mining operations," an activity
barred by the Surface Mine Control and Reclamation Act of 1977 within
300 feet of residences or within national parks. 40 Although the statute de-
fined the term to include "surface impacts incident" to underground coal
mining, the agency's interpretation excluded subsidence from underground
mining.41 On review, the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit agreed with
36. Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(1) (2006).
37. Energy Policy and Conservation Act, 49 U.S.C. § 32902(f) (2006) (discuss-
ing"[c]onsiderations on decisions on maximum feasible average fuel economy").
38. See Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards; Occupant Crash Protection, 46 Fed. Reg.
53,419 (Oct. 29, 1981).
39. Transportation Unit Cuts Estimated Cost Of Air Bags, Other Safety Devices in Cars,
WALL ST. J., Aug. 4, 1976, at 3 (describing the hearing of August 3, 1976); see also Morton Mintz,
Coleman, Nader Exchange 'Bigot'Jabs at Air Bag Hearing, WASH. POST, Aug. 4, 1976, at A2. Prior
to the close of the Ford Administration, and seemingly connected to the public hearings, Coleman
did announce an air-bag demonstration program intended in part to evaluate whether a full-scale air-
bag program "would be badly received by the driving public." Ernest Holsendolph, Coleman Puts
OffAir-Bag Ruling; Proposes a Limited Voluntary Plan, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 7, 1976, at 1.
40. See 30 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1328 (2006). Section 522(e) of the Surface Mining Control and
Reclamation Act (SMCRA) prohibits "surface coal mining operations" in certain areas, including
within national parks, national forests, and within 300 feet of occupied dwellings. Surface Mining
Control and Reclamation Act of 1977 § 522(e), 30 U.S.C. § 1272(e).
41. Interpretative Rule Related to Subsidence Due to Underground Coal Mining, 64 Fed.
Reg. 70,838, 70,843 (Dec. 17, 1999) codified at 30 C.F.R. § 761.200 (2009) (rule issued following
notice and comment). The statute defines the term "surface coal mining operations" to include "ac-
tivities conducted on the surface of lands in connection with a surface coal mine or subject to the
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the agency that the statute did not clearly resolve the question whether "sur-S 42
face coal mining operations" included such subsidence. The Department
defended its interpretation by reference to the policy concerns of the statute,
which included both environmental protection and the economic viability of
43underground mining.
These statutory delegations are too broad to conceptualize agency offi-
cials making these decisions as a mere "transmission belt" for the
implementation of congressional policy, as early scholars theorized." Nor
can agency officials generally be seen as "experts" on such value-ladenS 41
(rather than solely scientific or technical) policy questions. Instead, agen-
cies are often tasked with resolving questions that one might expect to be
resolved not by technical experts, but by institutions accountable to the elec-
torate.
Close congressional control and detailed statutory instructions, enforce-
able in court against an agency, could increase both the democratic
responsiveness and the accountability of agency decisions. Congress may
not consistently have the resources, the expertise, or the will to enact highly-
detailed statutes or to conduct extensive, systematic oversight, however.
Presidential control has accordingly become central, including in admin-
istrative law scholarship.46 These theories have focused primarily on the
President's accountability to the electorate through a national election. Some
have argued, Jerry Mashaw chief among them, that owing to the President's
national perspective, presidential supervision can assure an agency's democ-
ratic responsiveness, perhaps even better than close control by Congress.47 In
theory, the President has the incentive to transmit broader electoral prefer-
ences to agencies, the ability to take more of a national perspective on
requirements of section 1266 of this title surface operations and surface impacts incident to an un-
derground coal mine... " 30 U.S.C. § 1291(28)(A).
42. See Citizens Coal Council v. Norton, 330 F.3d 478, 483 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (finding that
statute did not clearly answer question presented and affirming agency interpretation under Chevron
Step Two); Interpretative Rule Related to Subsidence, 64 Fed. Reg. at 70,843 (Dec. 17, 1999)
("[T]he definition of 'surface coal mining operations' in SMCRA section 701(28) is not a model of
clarity."). But see Citizens Coal Council v. Norton, 193 F. Supp. 2d. 159, 164 (D.D.C. 2002) (finding
Congress clearly expressed intent to cover subsidence from underground mining in definition of
"surface coal mining operations"), rev'd, 330 F.3d 478 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
43. Interpretative Rule Related to Subsidence, 64 Fed. Reg. at 70,849.
44. See supra note 33 (citing Stewart's, Mashaw's, and Frug's descriptions of this view-
point); Kagan, supra note 11, at 2334-36 (suggesting that the President has an important advantage
in representing national majoritarian preferences compared with members of Congress, leaders of
interest groups, and staff of permanent bureaucracy).
45. Kagan, supra note 11. at 2353 ("[A]gency experts have neither democratic warrant nor
special competence to make the value judgments-the essentially political choices-that underlie
most administrative policymaking.").
46. See Cynthia R. Farina, Undoing the New Deal Through the Nev Presidentialism, 22
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 227, 229 (1998) ("[P]laced unambiguously under the President's direction,
[the regulatory state's] democratic pedigree becomes impeccable.").
47. See MASHAW, supra note 33, at 153. But see Nicholas Bagley & Richard L. Revesz,
Centralized Oversight of the Regulatory State, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1260, 1306 (2006) (suggesting
President is no less immune to interest group pressures than agency officials).
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policy issues, and the ability to be more responsive to the voters' will com-
pared with Congress.48
This argument about presidential supervision is not limited to the acad-
emy. In the setting of domestic statutory or common law, one would be quite
surprised to see a judge rely explicitly on the naked fact of presidential pref-
erences in support of an agency decision. And agency reliance on such
preferences is also rare.49 When judges review agency action, however, the
backdrop of potential presidential influence seems to confer greater legiti-
macy on an agency decision. The Supreme Court, in Chevron v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, famously explained why an agency statutory
interpretation deserved deference:
While agencies are not directly accountable to the people, the Chief Ex-
ecutive is, and it is entirely appropriate for this political branch of the
Government to make such policy choices-resolving the competing inter-
ests which Congress itself either inadvertently did not resolve, or
intentionally left to be resolved by the agency ....
The prospect of presidential supervision is only implicit; the agency rule
reviewed in Chevron made no explicit mention of presidential preferences or
of preferences that might have been expressed in the OMB review."
And in Motor Vehicle Manufacturers'Ass'n v. State Farm Mutual Auto-
mobile Insurance Co., in evaluating the DOT's decision to revoke a rule
requiring passive restraints in automobiles, Justice Rehnquist, in partial dis-
sent, suggested that "[a] change in administration brought about by the
people casting their votes is a perfectly reasonable basis for an executive
agency's reappraisal of the costs and benefits of its programs and regula-
tions."52 Some commentators have read the State Farm majority opinion as
rejecting political considerations as appropriate for agency decision mak-
ing,53 but this may be an overstated reading of the decision. The majority
48. See MASHAW, supra note 33.
49. See infra text accompanying notes 140-160.
50. 467 U.S. 837, 865-66 (1984); see also id. at 865 (noting that deference is appropriate to
interpretations that "rely upon the incumbent administration's views of wise policy").
51. In the final rule, the EPA stated only: "This action was submitted to the Office of Man-
agement and Budget ("OMB") for review as required by [Executive Order 12,291]." Requirements
for Preparation, Adoption, and Submittal of Implementation Plans and Approval and Promulgation
of Implementation Plans, 46 Fed. Reg. 50,766, 50,771 (Oct. 14, 1981) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R.
pts. 51-52). The proposed rule stated that the OMB had relieved the agency of the obligation of
regulatory review because the proposed rule was deregulatory in nature. See Requirements for
Preparation, Adoption, and Submittal of Implementation Plans; Approval and Promulgation of Im-
plementation Plans, 46 Fed. Reg. 16,280, 16,282 (proposed Mar. 12, 1981) (to be codified at 40
C.F.R. pts. 51-52).
52. 463 U.S. 29, 59 (1983).
53. E.g., Freeman & Vermeule, supra note 6, at 88 ("The inference [from State Farm] is that
political influence is a source of danger rather than of accountability"); Kagan, supra note 11, at
2380 (suggesting that the majority "implicitly rejected" Rehnquist's approach); Stack, supra note
18, at 307 n.191 (noting that State Farm now serves as "common contemporary shorthand for the
requirement that agencies rationalize their decisions in terms of statutory criteria, and that a change
of administration is not a sufficient basis for agency action"); Watts, supra note 12, at 5 ("Agencies
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simply did not reach this argument, and this perhaps was because the change
54in administration was not among the reasons offered by the agency.
Most recently, Justice Scalia, writing for four members of the Court in
FCC v. Fox Television Stations, hinted that political preferences could be a
reason for an agency decision. In that case, a five-member majority of the
Court upheld FCC orders finding indecent isolated expletives in broadcasts,
and rejected arguments that changes in the FCC's position should be subject
to more rigorous judicial review.5 In a section of the opinion joined by Jus-
tices Roberts, Thomas, and Alito (but not by Justice Kennedy, who joined
the rest of the opinion), Justice Scalia described the FCC's new position as
"spurred by significant political pressure from Congress. 56 Justice Scalia
suggested that a congressional preference for more stringent enforcement
could, in theory, be an appropriate reason for the FCC to adopt a more strin-
57gent approach to expletives in broadcasting. Admittedly, the dicta were
penned assuming, arguendo, that the FCC was, and constitutionally could
be, an agent of Congress, as well as based on further dicta to the effect that
the Administrative Procedure Act does not apply to Congress and its agen-
cies. Despite these potential differences from the case of agency supervision
by the President, one implication of the plurality opinion's discussion is that
an executive branch agency conceivably could rely on the preferences of the
, 58Chief Executive as a reason for decision.
should explain their decisions in technocratic, statutory, or scientifically-driven terms, not political
terms.").
54. See Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards; Occupant Crash Protection, 46 Fed. Reg.
53,419 (Oct. 29, 1981) (to be codified at 49 C.F.R. pt. 571). Judge Stephen Williams has suggested
that the reopening of the rule was justified in what he calls political terms (the "difficulties of the
auto industry:'), citing to State Farm itself. See Stephen F. Williams, The Roots of Deference, 100
YALE L.J. 1103, 1107 (1991) (reviewing EDLEY, supra note 10). However, the proposed rule cited to
by the State Farm Court was in fact a different one: it was a proposal to delay all standards by one
year. The notice of that proposed rule did state that the delay was proposed "in light of the fact that
economic circumstances have changed since the standard was adopted in 1977." Occupant Crash
Protection, 46 Fed. Reg. 12,033, 12,033 (proposed Feb. 12, 1981) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt.
571). Although it may have been part of the atmospherics of the State Farm case, a conclusion sug-
gested by the Supreme Court's decision to cite the rule that proposed it, that one-year delay was
adopted in a different final rule, Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards, Occupant Crash Protec-
tion, 46 Fed. Reg. 21,172 (Apr. 9, 1981), a rule not before the Supreme Court. Edley's description of
the case more fairly notes the "total absence from Justice White's majority opinion of any mention
of politics." EDLEY, supra note 10, at 183.
55. FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1800, 1810 (2009) ("We find no basis in
the Administrative Procedure Act or in our opinions for a requirement that all agency change be
subjected to more searching review'"). Although he joined the majority opinion, Justice Kennedy
also wrote a separate opinion to underscore his view that in some cases, a change in agency position
might still require more rigorous judicial review. Id. at 1822 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment) ("The question whether a change ... requires an agency to provide a
more-reasoned explanation. .. is not susceptible ... to an answer that applies in all cases.').
56. Id. at 1815-16 (majority opinion).
57. Id. at 1816 (Scalia, J.) ("If the FCC is indeed an agent of Congress, it would seem an
adequate explanation of its change of position that Congress made clear its wishes for stricter en-
forcement... ").
58. Another possible reading of the Fox dicta is that such preferences are permissible be-
cause the Administrative Procedures Act and its arbitrary and capricious review standard do not
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Despite the apparent support for presidential supervision in these set-
tings, some also argue that such political oversight undermines the
legitimacy of agency decision making. For example, in response to indica-
tions that one EPA opinion (on the extent of Clean Air Act preemption of
California's authority to regulate automotive greenhouse gas emissions) re-
flected White House views, Congressman Waxman attacked the EPA's
decision as "pure politics," in contrast to a "fair process that is based on the
science, the facts, and the law ... one of the critical pillars of our govern-
ment."59 This reaction represents an important opposing strain in the
dialogue on presidential supervision. As William Eskridge and Lauren Baer
commented with respect to the Ashcroft Directive interpreting the Con-
trolled Substances Act to bar physician-assisted suicide under Oregon law,
"If the President's advisers took a poll which reliably found 51 % of Ameri-
cans opposed to 'death with dignity' or 'assisted suicide' (assume the
terminology did not make a difference), would the Ashcroft Directive have
been more legitimate? Not much., 60 Further, as Jerry Mashaw noted: "[A]
retreat to political will or intuition is almost always unavailable to modern
American administrative decisionmakers.... [Sluch claims delegitimate
administrative action rather than count as good reasons."'" And in FCC v.
Fox, four dissenting Justices, led by Justice Breyer, expressed doubt that
"nothing more than political considerations" could be the basis for change
in major agency policies.2
While the State Farm majority opinion has been pointed to as an exam-
ple of judicial reluctance to embrace political reasons as appropriate
justification for an agency decision, a better example may be the Court's
2007 ruling in Massachusetts v. EPA.63 A majority of that Court rejected the
EPA's decision to deny a petition to regulate automotive greenhouse gas
emissions. The agency said its decision was based in part on concerns about
preserving the President's ability to negotiate emissions reductions with de-
veloping countries, avoiding a piecemeal approach to climate change, and
relying on voluntary executive branch programs to respond to the problem.
apply to congressional agencies. Perhaps, then, an executive branch agency could not rely solely on
presidential preferences and still satisfy that review standard.
59. Hearing on EPA's New Ozone Standards Before H. Comm. on Oversight and Govern-
ment Reform, 110th Cong. 1 (2008), (statement of Rep. Waxman, Chairman, H. Comm. on
Oversight and Government Reform), available at http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS 111049. Other
members of Congress did point out that "Presidents of both parties have asserted the right to oversee
and direct the actions and decisions of regulatory agencies." Id. at 7 (statement of Congressman
Issa, Member, H. Comm. on Oversight and Government Reform).
60. Eskridge & Baer, supra note 18, at 1177; see also id. at 1175 (noting that "other com-
mentators object" to presidentialist focus because it undermines institutional competence and rule-
of-law notions).
61. Jerry L. Mashaw, Small Things Like Reasons Are Put in a Jar: Reason and Legitimacy in
the Administrative State, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 17, 21 (2001).
62. 129 S. Ct. at 1832 (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("Where does, and why would, the APA grant
agencies the freedom to change major policies on the basis of nothing more than political considera-
tions or even personal whim?").
63. 549 U.S. 497, 531-33 (2007).
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The broadest reading of the majority opinion is that it was rendered against
the backdrop of allegations of inappropriate political interference in an
agency decision and is meant to ensure that agencies base their decisions
solely on "executive expertise," rather than politics. 64 A narrower reading of
the case is that it rejected the agency decision for relying, not on political
factors per se, but on factors beyond those permitted in the statute. As the
Court stated, "[t]o the extent that this [statute] constrains agency discretion
to pursue other priorities of the Administrator or the President, this is the
congressional design.' 65 And in a 2009 decision invalidating a Food and
Drug Administration ("FDA") decision to make the emergency contracep-
tive Plan B available only to women eighteen and older, a federal judge
found that contact between the White House and the agency was a factor
66weighing against upholding the agency action. In general, courts have not
offered clear guidance on whether political reasons, if offered, can serve as
an adequate basis for an agency's decision. The one exception: political rea-
sons prompting an agency to decide based on factors irrelevant under the
authorizing statute are clearly out-of-bounds.67
I want to make a fairly straightforward point at this juncture. Leaving
61aside, perhaps, interference in formal agency adjudication, very little about
presidential influence upon agency decision making seems inherently dele-
gitimating. Instead, whether presidential influence is a negative influence on
agency decision making, rather than, on another view, the main force shor-
ing up the administrative state, largely turns on the likely content of that
influence, about which we do not currently possess sufficient information.
Certain types of presidential pressure seem clearly out of bounds. Three
such situations are presidential influence that is inconsistent with the
agency's legal constraints; presidential influence that prompts the agency to
ignore its factual or technical conclusions; and influence that is aimed at
achieving some goal other than service to the public interest. Consider the
first type of inappropriate presidential pressure. A President cannot, of
course, push an agency to take action not authorized by law. For example,
64. Freeman & Vermeule, supra note 6, at 52 (arguing that the case is an attempt to "ensure
that agencies exercise expert judgment free from outside political pressures, even or especially
political pressures emanating from the White House").
65. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 533.
66. Tummino v. Torti, 603 F. Supp. 2d 519, 547 (E.D.N.Y 2009) ("The second departure was
the unusual involvement of the White House in the Plan B decision-making process.... Whether or
not it was permissible... these discussions were not the norm for the FDA with respect to this type
of decision.").
67. See, e.g., D.C. Fed'n of Civic Ass'ns v. Volpe (The Three Sisters Bridge Case), 459 F.2d
1231, 1236 (D.C. Cir. 1971). What factors a statute may make relevant is, of course, an interpretive
question.
68. The Administrative Procedure Act bars ex parte contacts in formal adjudication. See
Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 554(d) (2006); see also § 556(e) ("The transcript of testi-
mony and exhibits ... constitutes the exclusive record for decision... "); Myers v. United States,
272 U.S. 52, 135 (1926) (suggesting that the President cannot "properly influence or control"
agency decisions of quasi-judicial nature); Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F2d 298, 407 (D.C. Cir. 1981)
("[T]here is no inherent executive power to control the rights of individuals in such settings").
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suppose one accepts (as one should) the Supreme Court's conclusion that
the Ashcroft Directive interpreting the Controlled Substances Act to bar
physician-assisted suicide under Oregon law was simply beyond the scope
of the Justice Department's statutory authority." A presidential position fa-
voring the directive, for whatever reason, should of course make no
difference to the legality or legitimacy of the agency's decision, because the
agency remains bound by the statute.7"
Closely linked is the second situation in which the President pressures
an agency to disregard the facts it has found (does Tylenol present liver
risks?) or to base its decision on concerns irrelevant under a statute (cost, in
the case of national ambient air quality standards).' One recent example,
taken from the state law setting, involved the siting of a low-level nuclear
waste disposal facility in Nebraska.72 Nebraska was a signatory to an inter-
state compact on nuclear waste disposal, and the interstate commission had
identified a site in Nebraska for the regional waste disposal facility. In ac-
cordance with its statutory requirements, the state environmental agency
prepared technical studies for the site in question which suggested its suit-
69. Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243 (2006).
70. Consider as well the classic example of congressional pressure in the Three Sisters
Bridge case, in which a member of Congress threatened to hold hostage funding for the Washington,
DC subway system unless a federal agency agreed to fund an unrelated bridge-building project. See
Volpe, 459 F.3d at 1236. Some might suggest that such an attempt to influence agency action is
similarly "contravening the law" when the statutory delegation is to the agency head, not to the
President. For the reasons described above, the best reading of such statutes includes the possibility
of presidential influence. See supra text accompanying note 20.
71. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983)
("Normally, an agency rule would be arbitrary and capricious if the agency has relied on factors
which Congress has not intended it to consider .. "); cf. Kagan, supra note 11, at 2308 (suggesting
that Clinton may have elected to be less involved in agency decisions that were highly technical in
nature). Kathryn Watts suggests that, unless Congress has specifically foreclosed political factors
and influences in a statute, an agency is likely free to consider them. Watts, supra note 12, at 49
("Congress's silence could be read to leave agencies free to consider political factors and influ-
ences."). Whether a particular factor can be considered is ultimately an issue of interpreting
Congress's intent, however. E.g., George E. Warren Corp. v. EPA, 159 F.3d 616, 624 (D.C. Cir.
1998) (upholding the EPA's interpretation of Clean Air Act to permit it to consider treaty obligations
and the market for imported gasoline under Chevron Step Two). On some occasions, congressional
silence in the text of a statute has been interpreted to foreclose consideration of a factor. See, e.g.,
Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457, 471 (2001) (interpreting Clean Air Act "in its statu-
tory and historical context . . . [to] unambiguously bar[] cost considerations" in the EPA's setting of
ambient air quality standards). Other evidence has led an agency (or court) to interpret the statute to
permit consideration of the factor despite congressional silence. E.g., Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper,
Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1498, 1521 (2009) (interpreting statutory silence respecting cost in Clean Water
Act's cooling water intake regulatory provision to permit the EPA to consider relative costs and
benefits of a particular limit; upholding the EPA's interpretation of statute as reasonable); see also
Whitman, 531 U.S. at 490-91 (Breyer, J., concurring) ("I believe that, other things being equal, we
should read silences or ambiguities in the language of regulatory statutes as permitting, not forbid-
ding, this type of rational regulation [in which regulators take account of a proposed regulation's
adverse effects]."). The critical issue for an agency's accountability on judicial review, however,
should not be who advanced the concern, but whether the substance of it accords with the agency's
statutory authorization.
72. Entergy Ark., Inc. v. Nebraska, 358 F.3d 528 (8th Cir. 2004) (agreeing with Central
Interstate Low-Level Radioactive Waste Commission that Nebraska breached duty of good faith
under regional compact).
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ability, but the agency nonetheless found the site unsuitable and denied the
license. Memoranda in the agency's file suggested that the agency was un-
der strong political pressure to deny the license whatever the outcome of the
studies." This political pressure seemed linked to Governor Nelson's cam-
paign pledge to keep nuclear waste out of Nebraska.
Similarly, consider the judicial decision invalidating the FDA's decision
to make the emergency contraceptive Plan B available over the counter only
to women eighteen years of age or older. 4 The judge reasoned that political
pressure caused the agency to disregard the record before it and the recom-
mendations of scientific experts, stating, "Plaintiffs have proffered evidence
that the Commissioner did not make the decision on his own, but was pres-
sured by the White House and 'constituents who would be very unhappy
with ... an over-the-counter Plan B.' , According to the judge, the record
before the agency contained "overwhelming evidence that Plan B could be
used safely by 17-year-olds without a prescription, 76 and that the contracep-
tive's availability would not have a significant impact on sexual behavior.77
The court found that political pressure to serve the unspecified constituents
likely was responsible for the FDA's decision nonetheless to limit access
78
and found the decision to be arbitrary and capricious. One final example
also comes from the FDA. That agency approved a new device for repairing
the knee as "substantially equivalent" to grandfathered devices. In Decem-
ber 2008, the agency acknowledged that political pressure from, among
others, four members of Congress caused the agency to disregard its scien-
tific reviewers' conclusions that the device was not "equivalent" and thus
that the device should not have been approved without further study of
safety and efficacy.79
Allegations regarding political manipulation of scientific research fall in
the same general category. At the federal level, President Obama has re-
cently instructed the agencies to ensure the integrity of scientific
73. See id. at 549-5 1.
74. Tummino v. Toni, 603 F Supp. 2d 519 (E.D.N.Y. 2009).
75. Id. at 546 (quoting plaintiffs' exhibit).
76. Id.
77. Id. at 531.
78. Id. at 548 ("The FDA simply has not come forward with an adequate explanation, nor
has it presented any evidence to rebut plaintiffs' showing that it acted in bad faith and in response to
political pressure.").
79. See Gardiner Harris & David M. Halbfinger, ED.A. Reveals It Fell to a Push By Law-
makers, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 25, 2009, at Al (discussing approval of Menaflex knee repair device);
Editorial, Science and Lobbying at the FDA., N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 3, 2009, at A22.
80. For a discussion of political manipulation strategies, see generally Holly Doremus, Sci-
entific and Political Integrity in Environmental Policy, 86 TEx. L. REV. 1601 (2008), and Wendy
Wagner & Rena Steinzor, Rescuing Science from Politics: Regulation and the Distortion of Scientific
Research (Ctr. for Progressive Reform, White Paper No. 604, 2006), available at
http://www.progressivereform.org/articles/Rescuing-Science-604.pdf.
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information."' The concern here is that political views submerged in the
process of executive supervision may work themselves out through pressure
on an agency to skew its scientific or technical findings.82
The final case of illegitimate political pressure is where the content of
the pressure diverges from any notion of the public interest. What "public
interest" refers to is subject to obvious debate. "Public interest" could be
defined in a variety of substantive ways or procedurally (say, a majoritarian
view, the result of deliberative debate among elected representatives, or a
conclusion representing a compromise reached among the preferences of a
range of interest groups). But suppose, for example, the President pressures
an agency to decide in a way that benefits a brother-in-law because of the
family tie or a campaign contributor in order to obtain more funding for a
reelection campaign. Whatever the definition of "public interest," neither
motivation would seem to qualify as serving it. This type of executive influ-
ence obviously undermines the legitimacy of an agency decision, rather than
enhancing it.
These are, of course, fairly clear examples of presidential influence that
does not belong in agency decision making. The agency should not be pres-
sured either to disregard the law or the factual record or by influence in the
service of something other than legitimate public objectives. With respect to
pressure to disregard the law or factual record, the agency's action still must
be bounded, roughly speaking, by the terms of the law under which the
agency operates and by a demand for reasoned, nonarbitrary decision mak-
ing." Judicial review of agency action incorporates these norms to a large
extent because a court may vacate an agency action, under the Administra-
tive Procedure Act, if it is "arbitrary, capricious ... or otherwise not in
81. See Memorandum from Barack Obama, President of the U.S., for the Heads of Executive
Dep'ts & Agencies (Mar. 9, 2009), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the.press-office/
Memorandum-for-the-Heads-of-Executive-Departments-and-Agencies-3-9-09/.
82. E.g., UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS, SCIENTIFIC INTEGRITY IN POLICYMAKING:
AN INVESTIGATION INTO THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION'S MISUSE OF SCIENCE (2004), available
at http://www.ucsusa.org/assets/documents/scientific-integrity/rsi-final-fullreport 1.pdf; James
Glanz, Scientists Say Administration Distorts Facts, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 19, 2004, at A18 (describ-
ing Union of Concerned Scientists report); Christopher Lee, Ex-Surgeon General Says White
House Hushed Him, WASH. POST, July 11, 2007, at Al. As Holly Doremus has thoroughly dis-
cussed, scientific integrity within the agencies can also face other threats, including political
pressure coming from within the agency. See Doremus, supra note 80.
83. My argument here is consistent with Lisa Bressman's suggestion that scholars should not
overemphasize concerns of political accountability at the expense of ensuring that the administrative
state acts nonarbitrarily. Bressman, supra note 27, at 462-63; see also Rubin, supra note 25.
Whether these norms are "quasi-constitutional," as she suggests, however, need not be addressed at
this juncture. Bressman, supra note 27, at 503. They are obviously and appropriately part of a dis-
cussion on whether the administrative state's power is legitimately exercised. The appropriate
comparison would be with an evaluation of whether Congress's deliberation is meaningful or fo-
cused or instead whether Congress enacts bills hundreds of pages long that no one has read. E.g.,
Interview of Congressmen John Conyers. Jr. and Jim McDermott, FAHRENHEIT 9/11 (Tristar Home
Entertainment 2004) (alleging that no members of Congress read the USA Patriot Act prior to pas-
sage). An alleged congressional failure to read legislative proposals before voting raises no
constitutional problem--nor any legal problem enforceable in the courts-but it surely raises ques-
tions of legitimacy, which in Congress's case may be responded to in the electoral process.
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accordance with law." The brother-in-law case probably will be subject to a
judicial check only if the agency offers no valid reasons in support of the
decision or if the President is refreshingly candid. Failing that, the political
system will have to be the safeguard against this extreme case.
In some cases, needless to say, drawing the line between appropriate and
inappropriate executive influence can be more challenging. Consider, for
example, extremely close executive supervision of agency technical decision
making. Another difficult case is executive pressure to minimize negative
effect on the economic viability of a well-organized industry, where the
agency making the decision is permitted by the statute to consider economic
cost.
In this vein, it is worth noting the significant developing literature sug-
gesting that executive review may tend toward the technocratic issues, rather
than the policy questions. My colleague Steven Croley, for example, has
discussed the extent to which employees of the Office of Information and
Regulatory Affairs ("OIRA") are mostly civil servants, thus tending to make
OIRA review less focused on a political agenda than it might otherwise be."
Lisa Bressman and Michael Vandenbergh's survey of EPA officials suggests
that a focus of OIRA review has been on second-guessing EPA cost esti-
mates.86 Finally, a staff report of the House Committee on Science and
Technology suggested that OIRA staff scientists used a "peer review-type"
approach to directly challenge the conclusions of EPA scientists of a particu-
lar chemical's risks for the EPA's Integrated Risk Information System." The
Congressional Research Service recently described the fields of new OIRA
staff members as including epidemiology, risk assessment, engineering, and
health economics, suggesting that OIRA is boosting its own scientific and
technical resources, rather than relying solely on agency experts." The ap-
propriateness of executive second-guessing of agency technical findings is a
question beyond the scope of this Article.
Suppose, for purposes of discussion, we put these three cases of execu-
tive influence over agency policy decisions completely to one side. A large
space still remains in which potential presidential influence should be seen
as clearly appropriate. This space includes areas in which an agency must
84. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2006).
85. See Steven Croley, White House Review of Agency Rulemaking: An Empirical Investiga-
tion, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 821, 874 (2003).
86. See Bressman & Vandenbergh, supra note 4, at 67-68 (quoting survey respondents who
commented that OIRA became involved in rulemaking details and issues of lower political visibility
while other White House offices became involved when potential political impact reached a mini-
mum threshold); see also David J. Barron, From Takeover to Merger: Reforming Administrative Law
in an Age ofAgency Politicization, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1095, 1112-13 (2008).
87. MAJORITY STAFF OF H.R. SUBCOMMITT. ON INVESTIGATIONS & OVERSIGHT, llITH
CONG., NIPPING IRIS IN THE BUD: SUPPRESSION OF ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCE BY THE BUSH
ADMINISTRATION'S OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET 5 (2009), available at
http://democrats.science.house.gov/Media/file/Commdocs/hearings/2009/Oversight/l Ijun/IRIS_
StaffReport.pdf.
88. See COPELAND, supra note 4, at 22 ("Between 2001 and 2003, OIRA hired five new staff
members in such fields as epidemiology, risk assessment, engineering, and health economics.").
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make "policy judgments," as well as, perhaps, decisions on some more
technical or legal issues. Take the Interior Department's recent interpretation
of "surface coal mining operations," mentioned above, to exclude subsi-
dence impacts from underground coal mining operations. This had the effect
of permitting underground coal mining within national park boundaries and
within 300 feet of residences. The resolution of the statutory question re-
quired some balancing of environmental protection against the economics of
mining. These are inevitably value-laden decisions, no matter who makes
them. Congress might have provided more precise instructions on how to
balance these concerns.- Without such instructions, agencies would seem to
possess "neither democratic warrant nor special competence" to make these
value judgments." Within this space, many theorists and the Supreme Court
have suggested that some level of presidential supervision can be critical
and can make agency action more legitimate than if the agency acted alone.
II. THE LACK OF MENTION OF POLITICS IN AGENCY DECISIONS
The reality is, of course, that Presidents have long exerted significant in-
fluence over agency policymaking through the use of executive orders and
coordinating offices in the White House. Examples of relatively systematic
presidential supervision over executive branch agencies include Nixon's Qual-
ity of Life review group, Ford's executive order requiring the consideration of
inflation, and Carter's regulatory analysis executive order.9° As Paul Verkuil
wrote in 1980, "President Carter was hardly embarking on a new undertaking
as he tried to make the administrative process more responsive to the execu-
tive branch, which, in turn, is accountable to the electorate."9'
President Reagan systematized regulatory review with Executive Order
12,291, calling for comprehensive review by the OMB of all major rules is-
92sued by executive branch agencies. President Clinton replaced this with
Executive Order 12,866,9' which also provided for centralized OMB review of
all "significant" regulatory actions. President George W. Bush's administra-
tion continued to implement Executive Order 12,866, as modified by
Executive Order 13,422.94 President Obama, too, is implementing Executive
Order 12,866 (though revoking Executive Order 13,422 on the ground that it
89. Kagan, supra note 11, at 2353 ("[A]gency experts have neither democratic warrant nor
special competence to make the value judgments-the essentially political choices-that underlie
most administrative policymaking.").
90. See Exec. Order No. 12,044, 43 Fed. Reg. 12,661 (Mar. 23, 1978) (Carter administration
order providing for detailed regulatory analysis of rules with "major economic consequences");
Exec. Order No. 11,821, 39 Fed. Reg. 41,501, 41,501 (Nov. 27, 1974) (requiring agencies to prepare
inflation impact statements); Kagan, supra note 11, at 2276-77 (describing Nixon quality of life
program); see also COPELAND, supra note 4, at 1-6 (summarizing early history of OMB review).
91. Paul R. Verkuil, Jawboning Administrative Agencies: Ex Parte Contacts by the White
House, 80 COLUM. L. REv. 943, 947 (1980).
92. Exec. Order No. 12,291,46 Fed. Reg. 13,193, 13,196 (Feb. 17, 1980).
93. 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735, 51,738 (Sept. 30, 1993).
94. 72 Fed. Reg. 2763 (Jan. 18, 2007).
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embodied some political commitments not welcome in the Obama Admini-
stration). 9' Each of these executive orders has also included broad statements
of policy, ranging from Executive Order 12,291's statement that no rule shall
be undertaken unless its potential social benefits outweigh its potential social
costs, to Executive Order 12,866's statement that an agency shall attempt to
tailor its regulations to impose the "least burden on society."96 Moreover,
Presidents have further sought to increase their influence by increasing the
layers of political appointments within executive branch agencies.97 Mean-
while, administrative scholarship during this period has documented and
argued (usually) in support of the increasing importance of presidential super-
vision over administrative agencies.98 So, for better or worse, presidential
supervision appears to be here to stay.
Perhaps needless to say, OMB actions, including actions of its OIRA,
should be seen as part of this presidential supervisory effort.99 As a formal
matter, the regulatory review executive orders have expressly granted the
OMB and OIRA review and approval authority over significant agency rules;
an executive branch agency generally is not to publish such rules until regula-
tory review is completed.' 7 And as Kagan has written, references to the
President ought to include "his immediate policy advisors in OMB and the
White House."' °' Although top OMB officials, like agency officials, are se-
lected by the President and confirmed by the Senate rather than elected, others
have similarly treated OIRA, within the OMB, as an agent of the President
that is known for "pushing the political agenda of the White House"''0 2 and as
the "central White House voice ... on regulations of all varieties."'0 3 Official
statements of the OMB and OIRA similarly state that their functions include
95. Exec. Order No. 13,497, 74 Fed. Reg. 6113 (Jan. 30, 2009).
96. 58 Fed. Reg. at 51,736.
97. See Barron, supra note 86, at 1126.
98. E.g., MASHAW, supra note 33; Kagan, supra note 11. For some disagreement on the
precise effect of executive review, compare Bagley & Revesz, supra note 47, with Bressman &
Vandenbergh, supra note 4, and Sally Katzen, Correspondence, A Reality Check on an Empirical
Study: Comments on "Inside the Administrative State ", 105 MICH. L. REV. 1497 (2007).
99. The OMB is an agency located within the Executive Office of the President; its primary
function is to "assist the President in overseeing the preparation of the federal budget and to super-
vise its administration in Executive Branch agencies." OMB's Mission, www.whitehouse.gov/
omb/organization-role (last visited Jan. 17, 2010). OIRA, located within OMB, oversees, among
other things, "[tihe implementation of government-wide policies and standards with respect to
Federal regulations and guidance documents." Information and Regulatory Affairs,
www.whitehouse.govlomb/regulatory-affairsldefaultl (last visited Jan. 17, 2010).
100. Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. at 51,743 ("Except to the extent required by law,
an agency shall not publish in the Federal Register or otherwise issue to the public any regulatory
action that is subject to review [until OIRA has completed or waived its review].").
101. Kagan, supra note 11, at 2338.
102. OIRA Transparency Improves as Action Increases, OMB WATCH, Feb. 25, 2002, http://
www.ombwatch.org/node/360.
103. MAJORITY STAFF OF H.R. SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS & OVERSIGHT, 11 ITH CONG.,
supra note 87, at 2.
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"ensur[ing] that agency reports, rules, testimony, and proposed legislation are
consistent with the President's Budget and with Administration policies"'04
If we take the executive order requirements together with the theory that
presidential supervision supplies needed legitimacy to agency action, we
might expect to see some disclosure either by White House offices or by the
agencies, or both, explaining what effect presidential supervision has had on
agency positions. Indeed, since the outset of the Clinton Administration, the
regulatory review executive order has provided that the regulating agency is to
disclose "those changes in the regulatory action that were made at the sugges-
tion or recommendation of OIRA,"'' 5 and OIRA is to disclose to the public
"all documents exchanged between OIRA and the agency.
' '1°6
We do occasionally see presidential announcements that an agency has
been directed to examine a particular issue, or announcements of a particular
agency decision. Kagan has documented memoranda to agencies issued by
President Clinton, such as a 1995 "directive" to the FDA to propose a rule to
reduce youth smoking and another to the Labor Department to propose a rule
allowing states latitude to use unemployment insurance programs for parent-• 107
ing leave. Within a few days of arriving in office, President Obama issued a
memorandum to the EPA, directing it to revisit a Bush Administration deci-
sion denying California's Clean Air Act application to regulate greenhouse gas
emissions from motor vehicles. The memorandum stated, "In order to ensure
that the EPA carries out its responsibilities for improving air quality, [the EPA
is] hereby requested to assess whether the EPA's decision to deny a waiver
based on California's application was appropriate in light of the Clean Air
Act.,
108
Further, a Westlaw search of presidential documents beginning in the
Clinton Administration and continuing through the second Bush Administra-
tion uncovered literally hundreds of presidential statements directing agencies
to take action of one sort or another, including the promulgation of rules.' °9 At
104. OMB's Mission, supra note 99; see also Information and Regulatory Affairs, supra note
99 (describing OIRA's function as "implementation of government-wide policies and standards").
105. Exec. Order No. 12,866 § 6(a)(3)(E)(iii), 58 Fed. Reg. at 51,742; see also Kagan, supra
note 11, at 2286-87 (noting that the executive order required OMB to log any written or oral com-
munications regarding rulemaking involving outsiders).
106. Exec. Order No. 12,866 § 6(b)(4)(D), 58 Fed. Reg. at 51,743. OIRA is also to provide to
the agency all written materials relevant to a rulemaking that it has received from outside groups. Id.
at § 6(b)(3)(B)(ii), 58 Fed. Reg. at 51,743.
107. Kagan, supra note 11, at 2282-84.
108. Memorandum from Barack Obama, President of the U.S., to the Adm'r of the Envtl.
Prot. Agency (Jan. 26, 2009), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/
PresidentialMemorandumEPAWaiver/.
109. The Westlaw "Presidential Daily" database of presidential press conferences, announce-
ments, and speeches issued by the White House Communications Office begins in January, 1993; its
"Presidential Documents" database begins with executive order coverage in 1936, and covers all
presidential documents published in the Federal Register beginning in 1984 (usually executive or-
ders, proclamations, and trade agreement letters); and its coverage of the Weekly Compilation of
Presidential Documents begins in Jan. 2000. 1 directed the following query to this database, aiming
at documents dated after January 20, 1993 and before January 20, 2009: "direct the Administrator"
OR "direct the Secretary" OR "Secretary is hereby directed" OR "Administrator is hereby directed"
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least in these statements, the President acts as if the resources and authority of
executive branch agencies are at his disposal."0
Whether a President is willing to explicitly stand behind an agency deci-
sion has varied widely, however. For example, in early 2009, President
Obama very publicly marked as his policy a 35.5 miles-per-gallon automo-
tive fuel-efficiency standard-required by statute to be issued by the
Transportation Department."' Meanwhile, he kept his distance from a pro-
posed EPA finding that automotive greenhouse gases presented a potential
danger to public health and welfare, with the director of the OMB grudg-
ingly acknowledging the White House's support for the EPA's proposed rule
only in response to controversy at a Senate hearing.
1 2
Despite the directives and the executive order disclosure requirements,
however, public information about the content of executive supervision of
an agency decision itself, such as through regulatory review, is surprisingly
rare." 3 During the Clinton Administration, regulatory review documents and
data were "not searchable, incomplete, and difficult to understand."" 4 None-
theless, presidential influence was apparently very significant during that
period. "Of the rules reviewed by the Clinton OMB, the percentage approved
without change sharply decreased from prior years, the percentage approved
with change increased proportionately, and the small percentage either re-
turned to or withdrawn by the initiating agency remained roughly constant."' '5
According to a recent presentation of data from the Congressional Research
OR "Secretary is directed" OR "Administrator is directed." The search produced 247 relevant
documents.
110. E.g., Kagan, supra note 11, at 2316 ("[Clinton's methods] purposefully trumpeted (in-
deed, sometimes exaggerated) the President's involvement in agency proceedings... ").
11. John M. Broder, Obama to Toughen Rules on Emissions and Mileage, N.Y. TIMES, May
19, 2009, at A].
112. At a hearing in which EPA Administrator Jackson was testifying, Wyoming Senator
Barrasso suggested that the EPA's proposed finding that automotive greenhouse gases endangered
public health and welfare was political and not founded on sound science, waving a document pre-
pared by the OMB. Posting of John M. Broder to N.Y. Times Green Inc., EPA.'s Greenhouse Gas
Proposal Critiqued, http://greeninc.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/05/12/epas-greenhouse-gas-proposal-
critiqued/?scp=l&sq=barrasso&st=cse (May 12, 2009, 15:39 EST). OMB Director Peter Orszag
responded that "OMB would have not concluded review, which allows the finding to move forward,
if we had concerns about whether EPA's finding was consistent with either the law or the underlying
science." Posting of Jesse Lee to The White House Blog, OMB Director Orszag Corrects the Record
on the OMB & EPA, http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/OMB-Director-Orszag-Corrects-the-Record-
on-the-OMB-and-EPA/ (May 12, 2009, 16:31 EST). The EPA has now finalized the endangerment
finding. See Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings for Greenhouse Gases Under Section
202(a) of the Clean Air Act, 74 Fed. Reg. 66,496 (Dec. 15, 2009). Again, this decision did not seem
to be embraced closely by the White House. See Briefing by White House Press Secretary Robert
Gibbs, Dec. 7, 2009, available at www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/briefing-white-house-press-
secretary-robert-gibbs-12709 (describing EPA decision as the result of process "set in motion by a
2007 Supreme Court decision ... . The President continues to strongly believe that the best way
forward is through the passage of comprehensive energy legislation... ").
113. During the Reagan Administration, the OMB reportedly objected to approximately one-
third of federal regulatory proposals. Oliver A. Houck, President X and the New (Approved) Deci-
sionmaking, 36 AM. U. L. REV. 535, 540-41 (1987).
114. See OIRA Transparency Improves as Action Increases, supra note 102.
115. Kagan, supra note 11, at 2287.
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Service, the Clinton OIRA, by the end of Clinton's term in office, was per-
mitting fewer than 40 percent of significant agency rules to proceed without
change."16
Under President George W. Bush, the OMB and OIRA made a greater
practice of posting on the internet so-called "review" and "return" letters
prepared under Executive Order 12,866. Even with this improvement in
transparency, however, the documents released seem to concern only a small
portion of the "economically significant" rules reviewed and changed during
the OIRA review process, and an even smaller portion of all such rules re-
viewed by OIRA."7 A search of OIRA's database on regulatory review
revealed that between January 20, 2001, and January 19, 2009, OIRA con-
cluded review of 755 economically significant agency rules. Of those, OIRA
approved only 128 without change. It approved 555 rules consistent with a
change that took place during the review process, and returned 2 rules to the118
agency. The agency withdrew the remaining 64 rules."9 At this time, we
do not know that the changes in the rulemaking documents were prompted
by the OMB, but many of them probably were.
Meanwhile, despite the several hundred economically significant rules
that were modified during the review process, the Bush Administration
OMB posted only forty-two review and return letters that explain its prob-
lems with the agency rule under review.'2' President Obama's OIRA appears
to be even less committed to disclosure. As of January 20, 2010, it had
posted no further review or return letters at all.122 Despite campaign pledges
116. Significant agency rules are those subject to regulatory review, including rules with an
annual economic effect of $100 million or more or a material adverse effect on particular sectors, as
well as rules that raise "novel legal or policy issues." Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735,
51,738 (Sept. 30, 1993); see also COPELAND, supra note 4, at 13 (percentage of rules approved
consistent without change in 1994 was 53.4%; in 1995, 53.1%; in 1996, 41.4%; in 1997, 37.4%; in
1998, 36.1%; in 1999, 31.5%; and in 2000, 34.3%). Searches in the Reglnfo.gov database disclose
that the Clinton OMB reviewed 5,554 rules between January 21, 1993 and January 19, 2000, both
economically significant and not economically significant. Of those rules, 2,898 were approved
consistent without change, 2,214 were approved consistent with change, and the remainder were
withdrawn or concluded in other ways. Historical Reports, http://www.reginfo.gov/public/dol
eoHistoricReport (last visitied Jan. 17, 2010) (search results on file with the author).
117. Some changes, of course, could have been initiated by internal managers at the agency
rather than prompted by comments from the OMB. Future research might attempt to distinguish
these categories with greater specificity.
118. Searches were conducted on the Reglnfo.gov webpage. See Historical Reports, supra
note 116. In addition, four rules were marked "statutory or judicial deadline," and two more were
marked "emergency." Search results marked "'Consistent with Change' means OIRA has approved
the regulation with changes from when it was received." OIRA Transparency Improves as Action
Increases, supra note 102.
119. Historical Reports, supra note 116. OIRA reviewed over 4000 rules total during this time
period.
120. An agency official's possible motivations for responding to White House pressure has
been amply discussed by others and is beyond the scope of this Article. See, e.g., Strauss, supra note
4, at 713-15.
121. See OIRA Letters, http://www.reginfo.gov/public/jspIEO/letters.jsp (last visited Jan. 26,
2010) (listing return and review letters along with prompt letters).
122. Id.
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to "stream[] portions of cabinet meetings live on the Internet,' ' 3 his first
presidential memorandum on "transparency and open government" states
more guardedly, "My Administration will take appropriate action, consistent
with law and policy, to disclose information rapidly in forms that the public
can readily find and use."' Between January 20, 2009 and January 20,
2010, Obama's OIRA reviewed 120 economically significant proposed or
final rules. Of these, only 8 were issued without change; 46 were issued
consistent with change; and 12 were withdrawn.'2 In other words, over 90
percent of economically significant rules underwent some change or with-
drawal during the OIRA review process. That figure remains stable even
excluding economically significant rules that were submitted to the OMB
prior to the change in administration. Again, no review or return letters of
any sort appeared to have been posted electronically by Obama's OIRA dur-
ing that time.
In view of the data, OMB review over the past several presidential ad-
ministrations has almost certainly had significantly greater effects on agency
rulemaking than the number of public or posted review or return letters
would suggest. Consider, as well, a couple of anecdotal examples. In 2002,
the Army Corp of Engineers and the EPA jointly issued a rule defining "fill
material" under the Clean Water Act. The agencies defined "fill" to be mate-
rial placed in the water that would replace some water with dry land or
change the bottom elevation of the water body, and specifically interpreted
"fill" to include overburden from mining.m26 The rule was widely recognizedas facilitating so-called "mountaintop mining" of coal, because it would
123. Daniel Lyons & Daniel Stone, President 2.0, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 1, 2008, at 40, 41.
124. Memorandum from Barack Obama, President of the U.S., for the Heads of Executive
Departments & Agencies on Transparency and Open Government (Jan. 21, 2009), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/Transparency-and-Open_Govemment. Obama has
been praised for his clearer stance on Freedom of Information Act disclosures, in which he stated
that "[aill agencies should adopt a presumption in favor of disclosure ...." Memorandum from
Barack Obama, President of the U.S., for the Heads of Executive Departments & Agencies on Free-
dom of Information Act (Jan. 21, 2009), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/FreedomoflnformationAct/.
125. All data in this paragraph and this footnote are based on searches conducted at
http://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/eoAdvancedSearchMain for the period January 20, 2009 through
January 21, 2010. All search results are on file with the author. The percentages remain stable even
when the first month of the Administration is excluded; several draft rules, submitted by the agen-
cies prior to inauguration, were withdrawn from regulatory review during that period. Thus, even
during the period February 20, 2009, through January 20, 2010, over 90% of economically signifi-
cant rules were approved consistent with change or withdrawn. Fewer than 10%-7 economically
significant rules out of 101 submitted for review-were approved without change.
With respect to all rules undergoing review during the first year of the Obama Administration,
including those that did not qualify as economically significant, fewer than 30% were approved
without change. One hundred of 572 reviewed rules were approved without change, 409 were ap-
proved consistent with change, and 61 were withdrawn. Two rules were marked as subject to a
statutory or judicial deadline; it is unclear whether they were modified during OIRA review.
Even if the first month of the Obama Administration's regulatory review is excluded from
these counts, fewer than 30% of reviewed rules were approved without change.
126. 40 C.FR. § 232.2(6)(1) (2008); Final Revisions to the Clean Water Regulatory Defini-
tions of "Fill Material" and "Discharge of Fill Material," 67 Fed. Reg. 31,129 (May 9, 2002)
(codified at 33 C.F.R. pt. 323; 40 C.ER. pt. 232).
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authorize the Army Corps of Engineers to use its Clean Water Act authority
to grant permits for "valley fills" for the excess mining overburden that ac-
companies mountaintop removal, rather than requiring mining companies to
meet the more difficult permit requirements set by the EPA. 2 This issue
received extensive media coverage and attention in Congress. 28 The New
York Times quoted "the administration" as suggesting that limiting these
actions might mean "severe economic and social hardship for the region,"
including placing tens of thousands of jobs at risk. 2 As a "significant rule,"
the agency's "fill" definition was reviewed by the OMB, and the rulemaking
documents suggest that some changes were made. 13 Despite actual execu-
tive review and the high visibility of the issue, no public documents appear
on the OMB's websites detailing the extent to which OMB review may have
affected the content of the rule or the OMB's position on the rule.
Recent reports regarding a February 2010 EPA rule strongly suggest that
regulatory review affected the substantive content of the rule. That rule set
an air quality standard for nitrogen dioxide, which can cause respiratory
illnesses and other problems.' The rule provided for monitoring devices
along heavily polluted roads. The EPA reportedly preferred that devices be
located in metropolitan areas with populations of 350,000 or more;
following discussion of the issue with OIRA officials that took place over a
two-day period, the rule was finalized with monitoring devices located in
metropolitan areas with a population of 500,000 or more, resulting in 41
127. E.g., Kentuckians for the Commonwealth, Inc. v. Rivenburgh, 317 F3d 425, 430-31 (4th
Cir. 2003) (describing problem of excess overburden from mountaintop mining). The approach was
upheld by the Supreme Court in litigation challenging a mining company's proposal to use a moun-
tain lake for disposal of its mining overburden. Coeur Alaska, Inc., v. Southeast Alaska Conservation
Council, - U.S.-, 129 S. Ct. 2458 (2009).
128. E.g., Francis X. Clines, Judge Takes On the White House on Mountaintop Mining, N.Y.
TIMES, May 19, 2002, § I, at 118 (describing district court opinion vacating rule, later overturned by
the Fourth Circuit). A subcommittee of the Senate Environment and Public Works Committee held a
hearing on the rulemaking on June 6, 2002. Clean Water Act: Review of Proposed Revisions to Sec-
tion 404 Definitions of "Fill" and "Dredged Fill": Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Clean Air,
Wetlands, and Climate Change of the S. Comm. on Environment and Public Works, 107th Cong.
(2004), available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=107_senate_
hearings&docid=f:83696.pdf. Senators Lieberman and Jeffords wrote the President seeking recon-
sideration of the rule, while fifty-seven members of the House of Representatives wrote the EPA
opposing the rule change. Clean Water: Jeffords, Lieberman Urge White House to Oppose New
Mine Regs, GREENWIRE, May 3, 2002; see also Clean Water: Bush Administration Proposes to
Allow Mine Dumping, Greenwire, Apr. 26, 2002.
129. Clines, supra note 128.
130. 33 C.F.R. § 323.2 (2009); Final Revisions to the Clean Water Act Regulatory Definitions
of "Fill Material" and "Discharge of Fill Material", 67 Fed. Reg. 31,120, 31, 140 (May 9, 2002)
("[T]his action was submitted to OMB for review. Changes made in response to OMB suggestions
or recommendations will be documented in the public record."). Searches in the regulations.gov
database uncovered no such document, though it is conceivable it may be present on request in the
Army Corps of Engineers' Washington, D.C. office. See Proposed Revisions to the Clean Water Act
Regulatory Definitions of "Fill Material" and "Discharge of Fill Material", 65 Fed. Reg. 21,292,
21,292 (proposed Apr. 20, 2000) (to be codified at 33 C.F.R. pt. 323; 40 C.F.R. pt. 232) (listing
phone number to call to inspect supporting documents and comments filed on the rule).
131. Primary National Ambient Air Quality Standards for Nitrogen Dioxide, 75 Fed. Reg.
6474 (Feb. 9, 2010) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 50, 58, app. S).
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fewer monitors-approximately one fourth fewer monitoring devices."'
Again, the rulemaking document contains no mention of this discussion
process and no documents are posted on the OIRA website1
3
In addition, the White House, with the OMB, may shape agency policy
more subtly than through the regulatory review process. Consider the 2008
story regarding the OMB's treatment of the EPA's draft finding that green-
house gases require regulation under the Clean Air Act. Following the
Supreme Court's 2007 decision in Massachusetts v. EPA,' 34 the EPA was
required to determine whether greenhouse gases represent a danger to health
or the environment, thus requiring Clean Air Act regulation. In December
2007, the EPA prepared a document, apparently a proposed rule, concluding
that greenhouse gases did in fact require Clean Air Act regulation. The
document reportedly concluded that greenhouse gases endangered public
welfare, a conclusion that would have triggered an obligation to regulate
under the Clean Air Act.135 Unnamed officials reported that OMB officials
told the EPA that its email containing the document would not be opened.
136
The EPA responded in the summer of 2008 with a "watered-down version ofS ,,137
the original proposal that offers no conclusion. (Ultimately, in the Obama
Administration, the EPA did make the finding that greenhouse gases endan-
ger public health and welfare, finalizing the rulemaking in December,
2009. '38)
As this example suggests, an agency may not only respond to expressed
OMB views, but may feel pressure to reshape a decision before submission
to the OMB.'39 As with any response to executive review, this type of
132. See Primary National Ambient Air Quality Standards for Nitrogen Dioxide, 75 Fed. Reg.
at 6508 (noting that roughly 167 monitoring devices could be placed if metropolitan areas of
350,000 were covered, compared with 126 if the 500,000 population threshold were used); Matthew
Madia, White House Meddling in EPA Rule on Air Pollution Monitors, OMB WATCH, Jan. 28, 2010,
http://ombwatch.org/node/10733.
133. Searching the hundreds of documents in the regulations.gov rulemaking docket also
uncovered no further information besides the e-mails referenced in the OMB Watch article, Madia,
supra note 132.
134. 549 U.S. 497 (2007).
135. See John Shiffman & John Sullivan, An Eroding Mission at EPA, PHILA. INQUIRER, Dec.
7, 2008, at Al, available at http://www.philly.com/philly/inquirer/onlineextras/35668114.html.
136. Felicity Barringer, White House Refused to Open Pollutants E-Mail, N.Y. TIMES, June 25,
2008, at A15; Shiffman & Sullivan, supra note 135 ("White House aides ... called Johnson and
asked him to take it back.").
137. Barringer, supra note 136. The Bush Administration EPA eventually published an Ad-
vance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on July 30. Regulating Greenhouse Gas Emissions Under the
Clean Air Act, 73 Fed. Reg. 44,354 (proposed July 30, 2008) (to be codified at 40 C.ER. ch. 1); see
also Shiffman & Sullivan, supra note 135 ("Johnson instead echoed the White House's wishes and
called for more study on global warming, delaying any dramatic government action until the next
administration took office.").
138. Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings for Greenhouse Gases Under Section
202(a) of the Clean Air Act, 74 Fed. Reg. 66,496,66,496 (Dec. 15, 2009) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R.
pt. 1).
139. See COPELAND, supra note 4, at 17 ("[Siome agencies have indicated that they do not
even propose certain regulatory provisions because they believe that OIRA would find them objec-
tionable.").
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adjustment ultimately may make the decision a better one if the agency is
responding in a way that better serves the public interest. The adjustment
could also make the decision worse, again depending on the content of the
pressure and the goals of executive review. Either way, as the example
shows, executive pressure can be quite difficult to observe. Despite the high
profile of greenhouse gas and climate change issues, this story regarding the
manner in which the OMB exercised influence on the EPA did not reach the
newspapers until six months after it took place. And leaks to newspapers do
not seem to be a reliable or systematic method of increasing the accountabil-
ity of agencies.
In short, it seems clear that public documents describing OMB views on
agency decisions in the George W. Bush Administration significantly under-
state the impact of OMB review. With respect to the Clinton and Obama
Administrations, little or no public information regarding the content of
OMB influence is available. That public information may understate OMB
influence appears to be consistent with the history of OMB regulatory re-
view as others report it.' 40 The Government Accountability Office ("GAO")
reported in April 2009 that in twelve case studies of agency rules issued be-
ginning in 2003, OIRA review had resulted in changes to ten of those rules.
The GAO classified those changes as significant language changes or pre-
ambular changes in four of the rules. 41 In an earlier study, the GAO
analyzed eighty-five agency rules reviewed by OIRA between July 1, 2001
and June 30, 2002, and coded as changed, withdrawn, or returned, and
concluded that OIRA review had had a significant effect on at least twenty-
five of those rules. 42 The Congressional Research Service observed that the
GAO study, if anything, "understate[d] the influence that OIRA has on
agencies' rules because its findings were often limited to the documentation
that was available," excluding, for example, changes O1RA might informally
have suggested prior to submission of a draft rule for regulatory review.
Consider the words of a Reagan-era senior OMB reviewer: "I don't like to
leave fingerprints."'
140. E.g., Houck, supra note 113, at 544 n.54 ("An examination of the existing record makes
it clear that the claim that OMB does not influence or control many or all agency decisions is simply
untenable.").
141. U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, FEDERAL RULEMAKING: IMPROVEMENTS NEEDED
TO MONITORING AND EVALUATION OF RULES DEVELOPMENT AS WELL AS TO THE TRANSPARENCY
OF OMB REGULATORY REVIEWS, GAO-09-205, at 6 (2009).
142. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, RULEMAKING: OMB's ROLE IN REVIEWS OF AGENCIES'
DRAFT RULES AND THE TRANSPARENCY OF THOSE REVIEWS, GAO-03-929, at 5 (2003).
143. COPELAND, supra note 4, at 17. In 2003, the GAO stated:
In some cases, OIRA also reviews drafts of agencies' rules before formal submission ....
OIRA indicated that these informal reviews are increasing, and that reviews can have a sub-
stantial effect on the agencies' regulatory analysis and the substance of the rules .... OIRA
also informally consulted with agencies and reviewed agencies' draft rules before formal sub-
mission during previous administrations.
U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 142, at 7-8.
144. Houck, supra note 113, at 540 (quoting Reagan Administration OMB Deputy Adminis-
trator Tozzi).
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Given the argument that presidential influence increases the legitimacy
of an agency decision, together with the executive order disclosure require-
ments, we also might expect to see clearer reliance by an agency on
presidential preferences in explaining a particular policy decision. We do
not, however, generally see references to presidential supervision or prefer-
ences among an agency's reasons for decision. Take the Interior Department
coal-mining example discussed above. 45 Reversing an apparently longstand-
ing position interpreting the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act,
46
the agency, beginning in 1991, interpreted the prohibition not to cover sub-
sidence from underground mining. In its interpretations, rendered first in an
opinion of the Solicitor of the Interior and second in a notice-and-comment
rule, 47 the Interior Department not only considered a variety of traditional
statutory interpretation tools, such as the statute's language and legislative
history, but also quite explicitly considered policy concerns. These in-
cluded the need, in the agency's view, to balance protection for national
parks and residences against the desire to make so-called longwall mining
(as opposed to "room and pillar" mining, which removes a smaller percent-
age of coal) economically viable. Longwall mining nearly always creates
subsidence, and so applying this section to cover subsidence would reduce
(though not eliminate) the geographic area in which longwall mining could
be conducted. The Interior Department was quite explicit that the statutory
interpretation question might have a significant impact on the economic vi-
ability of longwall mining.
149
The agency's reasons for its interpretation involved the explicit balance
of the statutory considerations of environmental protection against economic
impacts. Further, the rule was considered to raise "novel legal and policy
issues" and was thus reviewed by the OMB under Executive Order
145. See supra text accompanying notes 40-43.
146. E.g., Areas Unsuitable for Mining; Areas Designated by Act of Congress; Applicability
of the Prohibitions of the Surface Mining Act to the Surface Impacts of Underground Coal Mining,
53 Fed. Reg. 52,374, 52,381 (proposed Dec. 27, 1988) (to be codified at 30 C.F.R. pt. 761) (suggest-
ing that prohibition should be read to cover only "subsidence causing material damage" as a relevant
"surface impact").
147. See Interpretative Rule Related to Subsidence Due to Underground Coal Mining, 64 Fed.
Reg. 70,838, 70,839, 70,843 (Dec. 17, 1999) (codified at 30 C.F.R. pt. 761) (stating that the rule
issued following notice and comment); Notice of Inquiry, 56 Fed. Reg. 33,170, 33,171 (July 18,
1991) (describing solicitor's opinion).
148. See Interpretive Rule Related to Subsidence Due to Underground Coal Mining, 64 Fed.
Reg. at 70,843 (mentioning "environmental values" and "encouraging longwall mining;" stating that
"this interpretation best balances all relevant policy considerations").
149. See id. at 70,849 (discussing the relationship of interpretation to economic feasibility of
longwall mining); see also Matt Spangler, Supreme Court punts case, affirming Interior changes to
coal mining rule, INSIDE ENERGY, Mar. 1, 2004, at 6. See generally Peter L. Strauss & Cass R. Sun-
stein, The Role of the President and OMB in Informal Rulemaking, 38 ADMIN. L. REV. 181, 184
(1986) ("[T]rade-offs [belong in the] hands of officials who are politically accountable; and they are
rightly subject to public scrutiny and review during the regulatory process.").
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12,866.50 Nonetheless, the agency's reasons for its decision include no
mention-beyond boilerplate--of the presidential agenda or presidential
preferences or even of OIRA review.' Nor do OIRA's publicly posted
documents or those of the agency appear to include this information.
For another more recent example, consider the EPA's decision denying
California's request for a waiver of Clean Air Act preemption for its auto-
mobile greenhouse gas emissions standard. The Clean Air Act preempts
states from regulating automotive emissions, 52 with one exception. By stat-
ute, the EPA can grant a waiver for a particular California automotive
emissions standard unless that standard is not needed to meet "compelling
and extraordinary conditions."'53 In response to California's submission of a
draft greenhouse gas standard for cars, the EPA interpreted the breadth of
the Clean Air Act preemption waiver provision to require that the "compel-
ling and extraordinary conditions" also be distinctively local.'54 Because the
EPA found that California had not made such a showing, it denied the
waiver.
Among the considerations bearing on the EPA's decision was the ques-
tion of how much autonomy states such as California should have to devise
their own pollution control standards. Newspaper stories suggested that EPA
career scientists supported a grant of the waiver to California.15 Meanwhile,
preferences of top White House officials reportedly played a role in the ul-
timate decision, and EPA Administrator Johnson acknowledged in
congressional testimony that he had discussed the application with theS 156
White House. One former EPA official told a newspaper that Johnson re-
turned to the agency after White House meetings and reported that "he had
been reminded of the president's policy preferences."'57 Despite the
value-laden nature of the agency decision and despite apparent White House
150. Interpretative Rule Related to Subsidence Due to Underground Coal Mining, 64 Fed.
Reg. at 70,863 (noting that rule raised such issues and accordingly was subject to regulatory re-
view).
151. The rule stated, "This document is a significant rule and has been reviewed by the Office
of Management and Budget under Executive Order 12866," and further noted that although the rule
is not considered economically significant, it "does raise novel legal and policy issues," within the
meaning of Executive Order 12866. Id. at 70,863. A search of OIRA's website also uncovered no
information on regulatory oversight of this rule, although the conclusion action was marked "Con-
sistent with Change." See supra note 118 (advanced search performed using rulemaking
identification number of 1029-AB82).
152. Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7543(a) (2000).
153. Id. at § 7543(b)(l)(B).
154. Notice of Decision Denying a Waiver of Clean Air Act Preemption for Califomia's 2009
and Subsequent Model Year Greenhouse Gas Emission Standards for New Motor Vehicles, 73 Fed.
Reg. 12,156, 12,160 (Mar. 6, 2008).
155. See, e.g., Shiffman & Sullivan, supra note 135.
156. Nina A. Mendelson, The California Greenhouse Gas Waiver Decision and Agency Inter-
pretation: A Response to Professors Galle and Seidenfeld, 57 DUKE L.J. 2157, 2164 n.44 (2008)
(reprinting Johnson's congressional testimony).
157. Shiffman & Sullivan, supra note 135 (quoting former Deputy Associate Administrator
Jason Burnett describing Johnson's experience with the White House),
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involvement, however, the EPA's opinion denying the waiver did not
118mention presidential preferences.
With a couple of notable exceptions, numerous searches of Federal Reg-
ister statements issued since January 1981 have disclosed no proposed or
final rules in which the agency referred to the content of OMB or OIRA re-
view or presidential preferences, directives, or priorities. 59 As a rule, then,
agencies generally do not say, "Options A, B, and C all seem open to us un-
der the statute; we are going with Option C because the President (or the
OMB or OIRA) thinks that one is most consistent with his priorities." Fur-
ther, while documents reporting changes from OIRA review are sometimes
placed in the agency's docket, which also includes all comments received
from various sources, it is fair to say that they can be extremely difficult to
locate.m6
It is worth turning to the exceptions at this point. Research has uncov-
ered mentions of executive preferences in two agency decisions not to
pursue a regulatory initiative.161 In 2003, the EPA declined to regulate green-
house gas emissions from motor vehicles; its decision does reference "the
President's policy,'' 62 including both presidential policies of "reduc[ing] key
158. Kathryn Watts also gives the example of the Clinton Administration tobacco rule issued
by the FDA, which President Clinton announced from the Rose Garden, but which made no mention
of presidential preferences or executive supervision. Watts, supra note 12, at 4.
159. Sample searches I performed included: TI ("RULES AND REGULATION") &
(REVIEW W/5 (OMB "OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET" "OFFICE OF
INFORMATION AND REGULATORY AFFAIRS" OIRA) /P (REVIS! CHANG! PREFE!)). The
same search was repeated for documents with a title of "proposed rule" or "proposed rules." I also
searched for the following terms in proposed rule and final rule documents: directive s "presiden!
or presiden! /p priorit!". Each of the small number of documents turned up by these searches was
then reviewed individually for relevance. I have also read widely in Federal Register statements, but
it is certainly possible that my searching is incomplete.
160. The GAO documented its difficulty-similar to my own-in searching electronic agency
dockets for the sixteen rulemaking case studies it analyzed in a 2009 report. U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNT-
ABILITY OFxicE, supra note 141, at 34 ("[[U]sing a variety of searching strategies], [GAO] found it
more difficult to find agencies' documentation of OIRA's regulatory reviews, primarily because of
difficulties using the search capabilities in the centralized electronic Federal Docket Management
System under www.regulations.gov.").
In addition, a member of the public is less likely to resort to searching through the electronic
docket if an agency's Federal Register notice has not mentioned that changes were made during the
OIRA review process.
161. Agencies also have occasionally mentioned, almost in passing, that they are taking action
in response to a presidential directive to consider an issue. For example, in 1982, the EPA an-
nounced that it was dropping plans to issue noise control regulations under the Noise Control Act
for truck transport refrigeration units, power lawn mowers, and a few other products. The agency
stated that it was reevaluating its "objectives and priorities ... giving careful consideration to exist-
ing Federal budgetary constraints and the attendant effects on these activities," and that it was doing
so "[in response to the President's directive." Proposed Withdrawal of Products From the Agency's
Reports Identifying Major Noise Sources and Withdrawal of Proposed Rules, 47 Fed. Reg. 54,108,
54,109 (proposed Dec. 1, 1982) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 204, 205); see also Average Fuel
Economy Standards Passenger Cars and Light Trucks Model Year 2011, 74 Fed. Reg. 14,196,
14,440 (Mar. 30, 2009) (referencing a presidential directive to proceed only with CAFE standards
for model year 2011). The fuel economy rule discussed in the text is unusual in the specificity of its
references to presidential priorities.
162. Control of Emissions from New Highway Vehicles and Engines, 68 Fed. Reg. 52,922,
52,925 (proposed Sep. 8, 2003).
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uncertainties that exist in our understanding of global climate change," and
relying on "voluntary actions and incentives.' 63 The statement also notes the
"President's prerogative to address ... important foreign policy issues"
raised by climate change.' 64 (This decision was ultimately vacated by the
Supreme Court in Massachusetts v. EPA on the ground that the factors the
agency considered were outside those permitted by statute.' 65)
In a more minor example, the Mine Safety and Health Administration in
2004, on remand from a court decision vacating an earlier action, noted that
its decision to reallocate resources away from massive air-quality rulemak-
ing was "consistent with a federal agency-wide initiative intended to
maintain sound regulatory practice" and cited a memorandum written by the
President's Chief of Staff.'66 Here the agency does reference executive su-
pervision, but only in a fairly general way.
Most notably, however, a rule finalized while this Article was being writ-
ten represents a striking counterexample to the general agency silence on
executive supervision. In March 2009, very early in the Obama Administra-
tion, the DOT issued new fuel-economy standards for cars, repeatedly
referencing presidential preferences and executive supervision. The agency
stated that it followed (precisely) the President's memorandum in issuing
fuel economy standards only for Model Year 2011, and separating those
standards from an ongoing rulemaking addressing subsequent model years.
The agency also stated that in its standards, it attempted to meet, "to the
maximum extent possible under [the relevant statutes] ... the energy and
environmental challenges and goals outlined by the President [including]
... maximum incentives for innovation, providing flexibility to the regu-
lated parties, and meeting the goal of making substantial and continuing
reductions in the consumption of fuel."'' 67 The agency ultimately selected
30.2 miles-per-gallon for passenger cars and 24.1 miles-per-gallon for light
trucks. 16 The agency engaged in a sustained discussion of its ultimate
choices, including balancing the need to reduce greenhouse gas emissions,
the "very serious conditions of the automobile industry, the national econ-
omy, and even the global economy," and the need of the United States to
conserve energy.' 69 Executive supervision is not specifically mentioned in
this latter discussion, or in the agency's reports that its rule was reviewed by
163. Id. at 52,930.
164. Id.
165. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 532 (2007) (stating that relied-on reasons were
"divorced from the statutory text").
166. Air Quality, Chemical Substances, and Respiratory Protection Standards, 69 Fed. Reg.
67,681, 67,686 (proposed Nov. 19, 2004). I am indebted to Kathryn Watts's work in identifying this
document. As Watts discusses, this agency statement was a response to a decision of the D.C. Cir-
cuit striking down an earlier proposed rule withdrawal as inadequately reasoned. Int'l Union, United
Mine Workers v. U.S. Dep't of Labor, 358 F.3d 40 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
167. Average Fuel Economy Standards [for] Passenger Cars and light Trucks Model Year
2011, 74 Fed. Reg. 14,196, 14,199 (Mar. 30, 2009).
168. Id. at 14,205.
169. Id. at 14,395-96.
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the OMB and other agencies prior to issuance.70 Nonetheless, the overall
impression is of significant executive supervision of the content of the
Model Year 2011 standards and even executive direction of the agency's
decision to issue standards distinct from those for later automotive model
years.
As discussed in greater detail below, the 2009 fuel-economy rulemaking
might serve as something of a model of disclosure of executive influence.
However, it remains an exception to general agency practice. At the level of
individual agency decisions-even highly significant ones-agencies usu-
ally submerge executive influence or control, rather than open it to public
view.
I1. INCREASING THE TRANSPARENCY OF EXECUTIVE REVIEW
A. The Costs of an Opaque Process
To sum up, there is a space in which we might legitimately expect to see
presidential influence, and in which-if we accept President-centered theo-
ries-presidential involvement could increase the legitimacy of the decision
and the administrative state by potentially increasing its democratic respon-
siveness, its democratic accountability, or both. Presidential supervision also
could, in theory, threaten the legitimacy of an agency's decision by pushing
the agency to take an action that disregards the facts or the law, or that does
not serve the public interest. As discussed in greater detail below, such su-
pervision may also affect agency accountability in judicial review.
Meanwhile, however, the supervision process is largely opaque. The
lack of adequate transparency has significant adverse consequences, both for
the appropriateness of presidential influence and for the legitimacy of
agency decision making. It makes it less likely that the electorate will per-
ceive that there is meaningful presidential supervision of agency decision
making, making the agency actions less legitimate. The lack of adequate
transparency also reduces the chance of the electorate understanding the
content of that presidential supervision, further reducing the accountability
of the President for those decisions.t"'
For example, take the "surface mining operations" interpretation exam-
ple. Deciding this question calls on the agency to balance environmental
protection and economic cost. Presidential supervision would seem to lend
legitimacy to the ultimate decision, in contrast to it having been made solely
by an "unelected bureaucrat." Conceivably, the balance the agency struck
did in fact reflect considered presidential priorities, but it is impossible to
170. Id. at 14,442 (OMB review); id. at 14,213 (discussing early cooperation with other agen-
cies).
171. E.g., EDLEY, supra note 10, at 190-91 ("The failure of courts to demand disclosure en-
courages secret politics, pretermitting the process of continuing, between-elections political
accountability.").
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know this from the record we have. This silence in the record reduces the
legitimacy of the agency decision.
Consider the best-case scenario. A publicly interested President could
attempt to detect public preferences and use that information to oversee or
to help shape agency decisions. Whether or not the President's actions are
publicly reported, it may well be that the President has influenced the
agency decision for the better. If the President gets it right, so much the bet-
ter for the public. Without some public reporting, however, this cannot
amount to an accountability mechanism for the political supervision. As
Edward Rubin has argued, holding an actor truly accountable requires a
public explanation from the actor and some sort of consequence if the actor
fails to follow through or to respond appropriately to a situation."' The
greater the information regarding presidential influence, the more able the
public will be to "assign[] blame or credit."'73 So, for example, the content
of presidential supervision, even if well motivated, might simply mistake
what best serves the public interest, however defined. Perhaps the Presi-
dent's priorities misjudge the extent to which the majority of the public is
willing to trade some risk to the environment for economic stability, if one
adopts a majoritarian conception of democracy. Perhaps the President might
have done a poor job persuading the public-given a more deliberative con-
ception of democracy-that this is the best outcome for the country. Unless
the voters know of the supervision and its content, however, holding the
President accountable and registering feedback is difficult.
The worst case is that there is presidential supervision and it is damag-
ing. Suppose, hypothetically, the President's major campaign contributors
were to be sustained by income from the longwall mining industry. Less
transparency would mean that the public would have a harder time detecting
the influence of the President and his advisors that pushes an agency deci-
sion away from the public interest-and less transparency would, of course,
reduce the political costs to the President of the "potential problems of sub-
jective willfulness."'
' 74
Even if presidential supervision of agency decisions is well known to the
voting population, holding a President accountable for particular agency
decisions is hard enough, given the infrequency of elections, the number of
issues typically on the agenda at the time of a presidential election, presi-
dencies that only last two terms, and presidential candidates who are vague
about how the administrative state would run.'75 It is all the more difficult if
172. Rubin, supra note 25.
173. See Kagan, supra note 11, at 2333. But see Philip J. Harter, Commentary, Executive
Oversight of Rulemaking: The President Is No Stranger, 36 Am. U. L. REV. 557, 565 (1987) (sug-
gesting it does not matter if "the agency head made the political choice based on his or her abstract
political belief, experience, cocktail party chit-chat, or whether the President or his delegate ex-
pressed their preferences").
174. See EDLEY, supra note 10, at 189.
175. E.g., Farina, supra note 32, at 995-96; Mendelson, supra note 24, at 619. For one exam-
ple of candidate vagueness regarding prospective agency appointees, both Barack Obama and John
McCain indicated in a 2008 presidential campaign debate that if elected, each might choose Warren
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the public does not know what influence the President may have had or may
end up having on particular agency decisions. "To the extent that presiden-
tial supervision of agencies remains hidden from public scrutiny, the
President will have greater freedom to [assist] parochial interests."'76
Calling for greater disclosure to the electorate is not to say that majori-
tarian preferences should dictate agency decision making. Increasing
transparency regarding presidential influence on a particular agency deci-
sion may or may not make agency decision making simply a "handmaiden
of majoritarianism," as Bressman suggests. 1 7 Instead, it could facilitate a
public dialogue where citizens are persuaded that the decision made, though
not the first-cut "majoritarian preference," is still the correct decision for the
country. By comparison, submerging presidential preferences undermines
electoral accountability for agency decisions and reduces the chances of a
public dialogue on policy.
One might respond that the public already knows that the President ap-
points agency heads and can remove them, and that White House offices
review significant agency rules before they are issued. And the public knows
the content of the agency's decision. Shouldn't that be sufficient to ensure
democratic accountability through the electoral process?.
That level of knowledge might suffice, but only if the public perceives
federal agencies as indistinguishable from the President. Voters are sophisti-
cated enough to know, however, that agencies represent large and sometimes
unresponsive bureaucracies, a view sometimes promoted by Presidents
themselves. Presidents certainly do not consistently foster the view that ex-
ecutive branch agencies are under their complete control. Instead, they have
been known to blame the agencies for unpopular decisions and to try to dis-
tance themselves. 79 Bressman gives the example of the second Bush
Administration distancing itself from the IRS, while at the same time quietly
pressuring the agency to revise a proposed rule requiring domestic banks to
reveal the identity of all depositors, including foreign ones. s0 Administrators
may also "take the fall" for an unpopular decision that is influenced by the
White House, as EPA Administrator Johnson appeared to do in denying the
California greenhouse gas waiver.' And as mentioned earlier, President
Buffett as Treasury Secretary, despite the lack of any showing of interest on Buffett's part. See Post-
ing of Cyrus Sanati to NYTimes DealBook Blog, Asked About Treasury Post, Buffett Just Smiles,
http://dealbook.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/10/08/both-candidates-suggest-buffett-for-treasury-post/
(Oct. 8, 2008, 13:06 EST).
176. Kagan, supra note 11, at 2337.
177. Bressman, supra note 27, at 503-04.
178. E.g., Katzen, supra note 98, at 1503 ("[Ilit is the product of the decision-making, not the
process of the decision-making, that is the key to accountability-however desirable it would be to
know who said what to whom in the oval office (or in the office of a presidential aide).").
179. E.g., Bressman, supra note 27, at 506 ("IT]he President has the incentive and ability to
hide control.").
180. Id. at 508-09.
181. Shiffman & Sullivan, supra note 135 ("Johnson declined to directly talk about White
House involvement. He said again and again, 'The decision was mine and mine alone.' ").
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Obama has selectively taken credit for federal agency actions relating to
automotive greenhouse gas emissions, with his OMB only grudgingly back-
ing an EPA proposed rule in response to political controversy.'82
Similarly, President George W. Bush distanced himself from an EPA re-
port concluding that global warming was anthropogenic, even though that
report had been reviewed by White House offices prior to its release. In an-
swer to questions from reporters, President Bush commented, "I read the
report put out by the bureaucracy.' ' 83 More recently, when news reports sug-
gested that the White House was pressing the EPA to "edit" its climate
change findings, the White House spokesman stated that the agency alone





Finally, take the rash of resignations at the EPA in the mid-1980s, including
Administrator Gorsuch and Assistant Administrator Lavelle, arising out of
allegations of serious misconduct and conflicts of interest within the agency.
President Reagan succeeded in distancing himself from the agency's prob-
lems by presenting the agency as acting more or less independently.'85
Despite issuing directives,"' Presidents certainly have a significant in-
centive to keep influence on agency decisions low-key and to maintain
"deniability" with respect to agency actions. This minimizes the risk that
influence can be characterized later as improperly motivated, that debate
within the executive branch can fuel litigation over the ultimate decision, or
that the President will have a political price to pay for guessing wrong about
182. See supra note 112 and accompanying text (discussing lukewarm White House reactions
to both proposed and final endangerment findings).
183. Katharine Q. Seelye, President Distances Himself From Global Warming Report, N.Y.
TIMES, June 5, 2002, at A23.
184. Barringer, supra note 136 (quoting White House spokesman Tony Fratto).
185. C.M. Cameron Lynch, Note, Environmental Awareness and the New Republican Party:
The Re-Greening of the GOP?, 26 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV. 215, 222 (2001). Reagan
successfully distanced himself as well from the Agriculture Department's 1981 decision, never
implemented, to meet budget restrictions by substituting ketchup for vegetables in subsidized school
lunches. See Howell Raines, Reagan Beats No Retreat in War on Bureaucracy, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 12,
1981, at A14. He did so despite the fact that the leading official advocating the plan was his political
appointee. See id. Earlier presidencies provide numerous other examples. President Truman fa-
mously stated about President Eisenhower's transition: "He'll sit right here ... and he'll say do this,
do that!! And nothing will happen. Poor Ike-it won't be a bit like the Army." Mendelson, supra
note 24, at 559 (quoting MARGARET TRUMAN, HARRY S. TRUMAN 551-52 (1973)) (internal quota-
tions omitted). About his own presidency, "Truman complained, 'I thought I was the president, but
when it comes to these bureaucrats, I can't do a damn thing.'" Kagan, supra note 11, at 2272. Presi-
dents Nixon and Carter both viewed themselves as being surrounded by hostile and unresponsive
bureaucracies. Id. at 2272-73.
Michael Herz describes an amusing example of the President's separateness from other por-
tions of the executive branch: "[Olne newsletter reported [with respect to a dispute over an EPA
rule] that 'many sources ... are convinced that [President George H.W.] Bush will side with the
White House."' Michael Herz, Imposing Unified Executive Branch Statutory Interpretation, 15
CARDOZO L. REV. 219, 219 (1993) (quoting President to Resolve EPA, White House Deadlock Over
CAA Permit Reg., This Week, INSIDE EPA (Wash., D.C.), May 1, 1992, at 3-4).
186. Kagan argues that President Clinton may have been something of an exception in his
desire to take credit for selected agency actions. But she declines to suggest that Clinton "never
influenced agency decisions in ways designed to avoid leaving fingerprints." Kagan, supra note 11,
at 2333.
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what option best serves the public interest. And, of course, keeping a low
profile for presidential influence also allows more successful presidential
pressure that is the result of presidential capture. s7 All this amounts to re-
duced electoral accountability for actions taken by administrative
• 88
agencies.
If presidential supervision is submerged, rather than declared publicly, it
may also undercut a claimed advantage of presidential leadership-the abil-
ity of the President to be responsive to national views. Voters often do not
know what they think, particularly about focused issues that are the subject
of agency action."9 It may take an event, a government action, or a public
discussion to engage an individual voter with specifics so that she can form
preferences. As I have described in an earlier work, controversy over the
Clinton Administration's "midnight rulemaking" relating to issues such as
road building in national forests and the level of arsenic in drinking water
prompted significant public discussion on those issues and probably helped
voters crystallize their preferences regarding them.' 9° While the electorate
could also react to individual agency decisions, presidential actions are often
more visible, and voters may also be more engaged, given their entitlement
to help select or decide whether to retain a President.
B. Making Presidential Influence More Transparent
1. Increasing Political Accountability Through Requiring Disclosure
So what can be done to increase the visibility of presidential preferences
and executive supervision within the context of agency decisions? A helpful
first step would be to require the agencies to summarize the content of
187. See Verkuil, supra note 91, at 951 ("[The] fear is that government regulation will be co-
opted by private groups through the intercession of the White House."). For a recent accusation
along these lines, see White House Climate Change Policy---Delay, Delete, and Deny, OMB WATCH,
July 22, 2008, http://www.ombwatch.org/node/3741 (alleging that "the oil industry, most notably
ExxonMobil, drove the administration's decision" to pressure EPA not to take action regulating
greenhouse gases).
188. See McGarity, supra note 8, at 451 ("[Slecret interactions between the agencies and the
White House or OMB staff in no way increase overall governmental accountability, because the
electorate cannot distinguish those policies attributable to the agencies from those attributable to the
President and his aides.").
189. See, e.g., B. DAN WOOD & RICHARD W. WATERMAN, BUREAUCRATIC DYNAMICS: THE
ROLE OF BUREAUCRACY IN A DEMOCRACY 146 (1994) ("On the vast majority of issues dealt with by
the bureaucracy, citizens have no specific demands or needs; they operate in a vague, impressionistic
world... "); Mendelson, supra note 24, at 617.
190. See Mendelson, supra note 24, at 628-41. This is why work focusing purely on the ex-
tent to which political accountability makes agencies more responsive to majoritarian views is
incomplete. E.g., Matthew C. Stephenson, Optimal Political Control of the Bureaucracy, 107 MICH.
L. REv. 53, 58 (2008) (arguing that an insulated bureaucracy can reduce variance in policy outcomes
and thus make policy more responsive to majoritarian preferences, because an elected politician's
views are unlikely to deviate from majority views). My argument suggests that transparency ought
to be a greater focus, rather than the extent of pure political control, because transparency is needed
to generate a dialogue with voters that will result in the formation of preferences and a greater un-
derstanding of policy decisions.
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regulatory review in issuing rulemaking documents. In the setting of agency
decisions, this would make political considerations, including on questions
of value, more transparent and the President more accountable for them.
Take once again the Interior Department's interpretation of "surface
mining operations" to exclude subsidence from underground mining. The
Interior Department might have said (if true) that the balance struck between
protection for national parks and other special landscape features and the
economic viability of longwall mining had been reviewed by OIRA and was
consistent in important details with the President's political preferences.
That would surely increase public accountability for the decision balancing
economics with the environment.
As mentioned, the March 2009 DOT rulemaking on automotive fuel ef-
ficiency might serve as something of a model. Although the rulemaking did
not specifically mention the content of OIRA review, the DOT indicated that
it had attempted to issue the rule by balancing competing policy concerns in
a way that responded to presidential preferences.9 '
How might a disclosure requirement be implemented? First, Congress
might enact a statute along the lines of Clean Air Act section 307(d), which
requires an agency to docket and make publicly available written rulemak-
ing materials it has submitted to the OMB, the OMB's response, and written
comments from other agencies.' g' The statute might go further and provide
that the agency's "concise general statement" of the basis and purpose of a
rulemaking decision, required under the Administrative Procedure Act,
93
also include any views expressed in consultation with other agencies, in-
cluding those of OIRA and the OMB . The agency would not have to
report the content of every conversation. Instead, the agency would need to
summarize the critical details of, say, executive review positions and explain
the extent to which those positions are connected to the agency's ultimate
decision. For example, that might include reporting that the balance struck
between safety and cost was the one favored by OIRA and summarizing the
reasons that balance was viewed as appropriate and, if true, that the agency's
initial position shifted as a result of executive review.
Second, and less satisfactorily, would be presidential incorporation of
similar requirements in an executive order. A President might order OIRA to
communicate with agencies only in writing and then to publicly disclose
those documents, or simply direct the agencies to summarize the content of
the OMB communications in rulemaking documents. As noted, however, the
disclosure requirements of Executive Order 12,866 have been honored in the
191. See supra text accompanying notes 167-170.
192. Clean Air Act § 307, 42 U.S.C. § 7607(d)(4)(B)(ii)(2006) (requiring proposed and final
rule drafts submitted to OMB, as well as written comments from OMB and other agencies, to be
entered on agency docket).
193. Administrative Procedure Act § 553, 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2006).
194. 42 U.S.C. § 7607(d)(4)(B)(ii).
1164 [Vol. 108:1127
HeinOnline  -- 108 Mich. L. Rev. 1164 2009-2010
Disclosing Political Oversight
breach. 95 Finally, agencies might self-regulate and issue rules requiring dis-
closure of this information in future agency actions. Ideally, the outcome of
any of these approaches would be the inclusion, by an agency, of informa-
tion regarding the executive review process, and the extent to which the
agency's ultimate decision reflects the views expressed in that process.
Including executive review information and the political reasons embod-
ied therein would have at least four significant benefits from the standpoint
of public accountability. First, this information would clarify the role of ex-
ecutive review, and make it significantly more likely that the public would
see the value-laden aspects of the decision as a reflection of presidential
preferences, rather than the decision of an unelected agency official. OIRA
and agency views need not be different to realize greater electoral account-
ability for a particular agency action. An agency could disclose a
modification in its rule resulting from executive review, or it could note, if
true, that its policy tracks presidential preferences. Under either scenario,
disclosure would increase electoral accountability for the content of the
agency policy decision.
Second, greater disclosure would help reveal the actual nature of execu-
tive supervision. That might include the extent to which executive
supervision is directed to value-laden issues or, by contrast, the extent to
which it amounts to second-guessing expert decisions made within the
agencies. It might also help us better understand the extent to which agency
officials either act with unquestioning obedience to presidential preferences
or else demonstrate significant independence and push back against execu-
tive supervision.
Relatedly, increased disclosure of executive influence also ought to help
deter such influence that serves inappropriate, non-public-regarding goals.
This is most likely to be effective when presidential influence is expressed
through the executive review process either as an executive endorsement of
an agency policy decision or in a way that documents its effect on the direc-
tion of a proposed agency decision.
Third, making this aspect of the agency decision-making process more
transparent would not only make it more visible to the public, but of course
to Congress as well. If Congress viewed the level of executive supervision
as helpful-or as interfering and inappropriate--Congress could legislate its
wishes with far more clarity.
Finally, a straight-out disclosure requirement seems superior to the
Watts, Edley, and Kagan proposals that judicial review of agency actions be
revised to treat political reasons with greater respect, in the hope of prompt-
ing greater disclosure by agencies or promoting a greater presidential role.'96
195. See supra text accompanying notes 105-106 (describing disclosure requirements); see
also Nina A. Mendelson, Chevron and Preemption, 102 MICH. L. REV. 737, 784-87 (2004) (report-
ing severe undercompliance by agencies with Executive Order 13,132, on federalism, and
suggesting that "[p]erhaps the Office of Management and Budget... has not been particularly inter-
ested in compelling agencies [to comply with the 'federalism'] executive orders").
196. E.g., Kagan, supra note 11, at 2372 (arguing that a "sounder view" of both Chevron and
arbitrary and capricious doctrines would take account of presidential involvement).
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First, as Watts and Edley acknowledge, such a scheme would require a "bold
agency to set aside its fears and to decide to act as a 'guinea pig' by openly
relying upon political factors in a rulemaking proceeding.' 97 Proposals fo-
cused only on how courts review political reasons, if they are offered, still
leave it up to the agency to decide whether to offer political reasons as a
justification at all. An agency, however, might be unwilling to be the first
mover for fear of risking reversal in court or public disapproval.
Moreover, Watts and Edley seem to assume that technocratic judicial re-
view is the primary disincentive to an agency's explicit discussion of
political reasons. However, there may be other obstacles. As discussed
above, for example, Presidents (and OIRA) have often chosen to lie low
with respect to particular agency decisions. A President may thereby seek to
maintain "deniability" and to avoid political risks, such as a wrong calcula-
tion regarding which policy best serves the public interest or is most
popular.' 9' In short, a judicial review approach that is more receptive to po-
litical reasons likely would be insufficient to prompt a substantial increase
in disclosure. In the meantime, we would not realize the greater political
accountability that would flow from increasing transparency.
By contrast, a disclosure requirement could be unambiguously enforced
by courts. Indeed, it could be coupled with instructions from Congress on
how courts are to evaluate political reasons. Even if no such instructions
were forthcoming, a disclosure requirement would likely mean that the judi-
ciary would be presented with a stream of administrative review cases
posing questions regarding the treatment of political reasons. These would
provide an avenue for the development of judicial review approaches. What
that judicial review might look like is discussed in greater detail in the next
section.
2. Process and Enforcement Concerns
Greater disclosure might be criticized on several grounds. First, it might
be objected that disclosure would undermine effective decision making by
deterring full and frank discussion of policy options. Similar discussions,
when in documents, receive protection from the Freedom of Information Act
disclosure requirements through the Act's "deliberative process" excep-
tion. 99 Any proposal to increase transparency will burden private
197. Watts, supra note 12, at 75; see EDLEY, supra note 10, at 192 ("[Developing judicial
doctrine] requires a substantial number of cases that squarely address the politics issues. Only lead-
ership can overcome the chicken-and-egg problem.").
198. See supra text accompanying notes 179-189.
199. See 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2006). See generally STEPHEN G. BREYER ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW AND REGULATORY POLICY 685 (6th ed. 2006) ("The purpose of privilege is to preserve free
and frank discussions within government, which would be hindered if opinions and recommenda-
tions advanced during the deliberative process could be obtained by the public."); Cary Coglianese,
The Transparency President? The Obama Administration and Open Government 13 (Univ. Pa. Law
Sch., Public Law and Legal Theory Research Paper No. 09-18) (expressing concern about undue
transparency that "officials will not engage in as probing and self-critical forms of deliberation"),
available at http://papers.ssm.comlsol3/papers.cfmabstractid= 1433815.
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discussions somewhat. The net cost is arguably larger if one views the ex-
ecutive staff as highly competent and motivated to serve only the public
interest. In that case, the disclosure obligation might simply serve to under-
score that the agencies are under executive supervision, but have less value
in terms of deterring inappropriate presidential oversight. If executive su-
pervision were less appropriately motivated and aimed, say, at getting
agencies to distribute rents to narrowly focused interest groups, the disclo-
sure obligation would have significantly greater value on balance.
With this proposal, moreover, not every conversation between officials
in different offices would be subject to disclosure. Instead, at the time the
agency publishes its proposed or final rule, the agency would have to sum-
marize the final position reached in the executive review process. This
would still leave considerable room for private deliberations both within
OIRA and within the agency.200
A second concern is that a disclosure requirement could conceivably
prompt a President to try to deny involvement with a particular agency deci-
sion, by stating that executive review was not conducted or that the agency
was left to its own devices in reaching a decision. That could reduce, rather
than increase, electoral accountability. If a disclosure requirement is consis-
tently applied, however, this seems unlikely. As the data suggest, executive
influence over agency rulemaking decisions appears to be widespread. A
disclosure requirement is likely to confirm that generalized influence, and to
create a baseline norm that executive supervision occurs. If a President were
to take a "hands off' approach with respect to a particular agency decision,
then the public would be more likely to perceive not a rogue agency (if the
decision is a bad one), but a presidential failure to oversee the agency.
Another concern is that disclosure might not be thorough enough to ac-
complish its purposes. For example, one result of this sort of disclosure
requirement might simply be a "new kind of boilerplate" in agency publica-
201 202tions, which has resulted from some executive orders. To the extent
disclosure requirements are statutory, and at least some discovery is possi-
ble, however, the availability of judicial enforcement would increase the
chances that disclosure is not merely boilerplate but genuine.
200. Some have suggested that greater disclosure of executive influence might expose agen-
cies to more pressure from special interest groups, because an agency might have to reveal that it did
not take a position consistent with the one desired by the interest group. Past vagueness regarding
the influence of executive oversight in rulemaking perhaps has allowed the agency to avoid blame
for not agreeing with an interest group. On the other hand, more clarity regarding the role of execu-
tive oversight in value-laden decisions made by an agency might reduce special interest group
pressure on agencies, since it would be clearer that agencies are not in a position to deliver on any
sort of promise. It might in turn shift that pressure to OIRA.
201. E.g., Bressman, supra note 27, at 510-11 (discussing a "new kind of boilerplate"-a
presidential seal of approval disconnected from genuine presidential participation in the decision);
Houck, supra note 113, at 547 ("The result of disclosure will be paperwork that sanitizes the mes-
sages to avoid reversible error.").
202. E.g., Mendelson, supra note 195 (noting Executive Order 13,132's lack of impact on
agency considerations of federalism issues).
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A further concern is that disclosure might not be altogether candid. Pub-
lic-regarding reasons for a particular balance of policy concerns, perhaps,
might be offered in lieu of the real, less publicly focused ones. Even such an
outcome, however, may well represent an improvement over the status quo.
If agency and OIRA officials feel constrained by the presence of an audi-
ence to articulate reasons grounded in the public interest and to hide more
unappealing motives, this oversight may push them in the direction of
moderating their actual motives.2°' As Garrett and Vermeule have argued
with respect to legislators having to articulate reasons for their decisions,
"The need to articulate public-regarding rationales requires participants to
move away from positions too obviously tailored to their self-interest, and
partially commits them to maintain prior positions even in changed circum-
stances.'' °
Another concern is that a disclosure requirement might simply prompt
political supervision to move in other, less-subject-to-disclosure directions.
Political decisions might be pushed down into the agencies and executive
review of particular agency decisions nearly eliminated. As a replacement
for direct supervision of decisions, the White House might select agency
officials whose views very closely resemble their own and thus require less
supervision.
A significant move in this direction seems unlikely, however. First,
Presidents have already availed themselves of the appointment option.
President George W. Bush took it a step further by imposing a now-repealed
requirement of the designation of a presidentially appointed "Regulatory
Policy Officer" within each agency, whose approval was necessary in order
to commence a rulemaking. It is unclear how much potential there is for
even greater alignment between appointee and presidential views.
Moreover, given the inherent difficulties in discerning an appointee's
views on every topic and in fully anticipating an agency's agenda, personnel
selection alone is a comparatively weak means for a President to obtain de-
sirable agency decisions. Centralized supervision of particular decisions is a
203. See Cass Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REV. 29, 78
(1985) ("[R]equiring justifications does serve an important prophylactic function.... [It] should
improve representative politics by ensuring that the deliberative process is focused on those pur-
poses and the extent to which the classifications serve them....").
204. Elizabeth Garrett & Adrian Vermeule, Institutional Design of a Thayerian Congress, 50
DUKE L.J. 1277, 1291 (2001); see also Jon Elster, Deliberation and Constitution Making, in DELIB-
ERATIVE DEMOCRACY 97, 111 (Jon Elster ed. 1998); cf Jonathan R. Macey, Promoting
Public-Regarding Legislation Through Statutory Interpretation: An Interest Group Model, 86
COLUM. L. REV. 223, 227 (1986) (arguing that even if Congress's claims of public reasons for laws
are hypocritical, interpreting them to effectuate those goals will make legislation more public-
regarding overall). Similarly, disclosure also might be less than candid, which might lead to greater
public confusion rather than public accountability. This type of disclosure, however, would un-
doubtedly not comply with statutory terms.
205. The only exception was a rulemaking "specifically authorized by the head of the
agency." See Exec. Order No. 13,422, 72 Fed. Reg. 2763, 2764 (Jan. 23, 2007) ("Unless specifically
authorized by the head of the agency, no rulemaking shall commence nor be included on the Plan
without the approval of the agency's Regulatory Policy Office .... ), repealed by Exec. Order No.
13,497, 74 Fed. Reg. 6113 (Feb. 4, 2009).
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far more direct way of getting those decisions to track a President's agenda.
This is undoubtedly a reason for the prevalence of that supervision. Presi-
dents have exerted supervisory authority over significant administrative
decisions at least since the Reagan Administration. The data presented
above confirm its existence. Even with a disclosure requirement, a President
is unlikely to give up this influence over the administrative state's direction
and instead rely on personnel selection alone to achieve her goals.
If executive supervision over agency decisions were indeed eliminated
in reaction to disclosure requirements, however, there might be two conse-
quences for the treatment of value-laden decisions. First, value questions
might be explicitly resolved by agencies themselves in notices of proposed
and final rules. For example, the agency itself might explain-assuming that
such factors were permissible for it to consider by statute-that the agency
was electing a longer lead time to achieve an environmental goal in order to
preserve manufacturing flexibility. Such statements are already made by
agencies. A disclosure regime might still represent an increase in account-
ability over a nondisclosure regime because it could establish a norm of
executive supervision. Rather than blaming the agency for making an inap-
propriate decision, the electorate might hold the President accountable for
failing to adequately supervise agency decisions.
A second possible consequence is that the "value" aspects of agency
decisions would no longer receive focused attention, either through the
executive supervision process or within public documents issued by
agencies. Perhaps sensitive to concerns that such decisions should not be
made by unelected bureaucrats, an agency could shade scientific or other
expertise-laden aspects of decisions to get to a particular outcome with-
out disclosing the real reason for the decision. Such shading is alleged to
occur already, though largely in response to executive supervision.20, If
increased shading took place in response to subtle executive pressure, a
well-designed disclosure regime should, at least, result in the revelation
of some of that pressure, thereby deterring shading. However, if the
shading were to take place solely within the agencies, the disclosure
proposal described above, which applies only to executive supervision,
would not help. It is unclear why an executive supervision disclosure
proposal, however, would result in greater shading inside an agency that
would not also be considered a response to executive influence (and thus
covered by the disclosure requirements). Moreover, the same incentives
that have prompted Presidents to centralize executive supervision of
agency decisions are likely to deter a President from forgoing supervi-
sion altogether.
Another concern about a disclosure requirement is that extensive dis-
covery of agency officials, if part of enforcing the disclosure requirement,
could disrupt agency decision making. One answer to this is to permit only
limited discovery. Limited discovery would represent a good balance be-
tween enforcing disclosure and avoiding disruption. In a similar setting, in
206. See e.g., Doremus, supra note 80.
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Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, the Supreme Court sug-
gested there could be discovery of agency documents, as well as of officials,
relating to a decision under review, if formal findings were lacking or in the
event of bad faith or improper behavior.207 The D.C. Circuit has found lim-
ited discovery appropriate in reviewing an agency's compliance with
particular procedural requirements.08 A similar standard could be applied in
the setting of executive supervision.
Finally, a disclosure requirement could be undermined if an agency or
the OMB asserted executive privilege in response to discovery requests.
Such arguments might raise the same sorts of issues already raised (though
apparently not resolved) by section 307 of the Clean Air Act. Executive
privilege arguments could, of course, be strong if the President were directly
involved in communication with the agency.209 They are likely to be weaker
where communications involve only officials other than the President and
2101are aimed at informing an agency decision, rather than a presidential one.
207. 401 U.S. 402,420 (1971).
208. Esch v. Yeutter, 876 F.2d 976 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (permitting partial discovery regarding
agency's compliance with procedural requirements). Other decisions of the D.C. Circuit similarly
contemplate discovery from an agency under some circumstances, though arguably in a more lim-
ited fashion than under Esch. See, e.g., IMS, P.C. v. Alvarez, 129 E3d 618, 624 (D.C. Cir. 1997)
(holding plaintiffs could not obtain discovery of an agency because plaintiffs did not show agency
"failed to examine all relevant factors or to adequately explain its grounds for decision, or that the
agency acted in bad faith or engaged in improper behavior in reaching its decision"). While devel-
opment of a precise discovery standard is beyond the scope of this Article, one possibility would be
to authorize extensive discovery only if there are allegations of bad faith, improper behavior, or
suppression of documents, e.g., Comm. for Nuclear Responsibility v. Seaborg, 463 F.2d 783 (D.C.
Cir. 1971), and otherwise to permit an agency to submit an affidavit detailing its compliance with
such a statute, see, e.g., Trentadue v. FBI, 572 F.3d 794 (10th Cir. 2009) (permitting agency to dem-
onstrate Freedom of Information Act compliance through affidavit submissions).
209. See Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298, 407 (D.C. Cir. 1981) ("Where the President
himself is directly involved in oral communications with Executive Branch officials, Article II con-
siderations-combined with the strictures of Vermont Yankee-require that courts tread with
extraordinary caution in mandating disclosure beyond that already required by statute.").
210. The White House reportedly asserted executive privilege in response to a congressional
subpoena seeking documents "relating to the E.P.A.'s handling of recent climate-change and air-
pollution decisions." Barringer, supra note 136; see also Letter from Michael B. Mukasey, Attorney
Gen. of the U.S., to George W. Bush, President of the U.S. (June 19, 2008), available at http://
www.justice.gov/olc/2008/ozonecalwaiveragletter.pdf (discussing privileges asserted by the EPA
and the Justice Department). The House Government Reform Committee prepared a draft memo-
randum arguing that no such privilege is appropriate with respect to communications between OIRA
and the agency. See Draft Report of the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, U.S.
House of Representatives, Regarding the Bush Administration's Abuse of Power in Asserting Execu-
tive Privilege in Response to Committee Subpoenas to Stephen Johnson, Administrator,
Environmental Protection Agency, and Susan Dudley, Administrator, White House Office of Man-
agement and Budget (Oct. 14, 2008), available at http://www2.grist.org/gristmill/images/user/6337/
oversightEP.pdf.
Indeed, while the question is not settled, it seems unlikely that an executive privilege claim
would succeed with respect to communications from OIRA to the agency. Such a claim would not
likely qualify as a privileged "presidential communication" since it is not a communication to or by
the President or a communication made for the purpose of assisting a direct decision made by the
President. See In re Sealed Case, 121 F.3d 729, 752 (D.C. Cir. 1997) ("The presidential communica-
tions .privilege should never serve as a means of shielding information regarding governmental
operations that do not call ultimately for direct decisionmaking by the President."). In addition, the
communication might not be held to relate to a quintessential Article 1I function, such as the use of
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3. Judicial Review
Suppose agencies do indeed begin disclosing political reasons in their
decisions. Judges responsible for reviewing agency decisions would need to
take account of those reasons. That could raise two largely opposed con-
cerns. On one side, such a regime could result in overly intrusive review, if
judges second-guess value-laden political reasons and insert their own val-
ues into the process. On the other, out of deference to the President or
concern about institutional competence, judges might be tempted to avoid
examining political reasons altogether, raising the possibility that some
agency decisions would be immunized from effective judicial review.
The first concern is the risk of overly intrusive judicial review. Under a
regime of greater disclosure, courts would presumably continue to review an
agency's rulemaking under the APA's "arbitrary or capricious" standard."'
The argument might be that with more information about the content of ex-
ecutive supervision and likely greater candor about policy calls, a judge
would be tempted to second-guess OIRA's or the President's reasons on
questions of value, such as the circumstances under which the environment
is prioritized ahead of (or behind) the economic impact.
This would be undesirable, since by hypothesis, these sorts of questions
often implicate policy issues we prefer to see resolved by politically ac-
countable institutions. Executive and congressional oversight both seem
superior to judicial review in this respect. The judiciary, being the least de-
mocratically accountable of the three branches, would also be the least
competent, from an institutional standpoint, to resolve these questions of
social value and to second-guess the executive decision-making process. (Of
course, if the views of OIRA relate to how to read the text of a statute or to
technical issues, courts could review them in the usual way.)
To avoid this, courts ought to apply an approach that is deferential to
value preferences or policy calls, as they have in other settings. An ex-
ample of such an approach is that was outlined by Justice Marshall in his
212Heckler v. Chaney concurrence. In that case, the Supreme Court de-
clined to review an agency's decision not to enforce its authorizing
statute, in large part because such a decision "involves a complicated
balancing of a number of factors which are peculiarly within its exper-
tise," such as resource allocation and the agency's overall priorities.2 "
Justice Marshall advocated review in his concurring opinion, but argued for
a highly deferential review standard in recognition of the "sort of choice
over which agencies generally have been left substantial discretion ....
the appointments power. The deliberative process privilege, a common law privilege, would seem to
encompass OIRA communications with an agency, but such a privilege likely would more readily
yield to statutory override, representing the congressional determination that access is appropriate.
See id. at 737.
211. See 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2006).
212. Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821 (1985).
213. Id. at 831.
214. Id. at 842 (Marshall, J., concurring).
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The best balance in the setting of disclosure of executive supervision might
be struck by following the lead of the Marshall concurrence, in which courts
review the reasons but treat them highly deferentially.
The approach to judicial review that I describe here has some similari-
ties to the one laid out by Watts. She, too, suggests that review should be
deferential, in the sense that a judge might need merely to determine that an
agency's reliance on "the factual existence" of presidential preferences was
rational .2 " However, she also argues that courts would need to consider
whether political influence was expressed in a form reinforcing "account-
ability, public participation, and representativeness," or whether it was more
of a "back door" nature.26 By contrast, my approach would directly require
217the disclosure of executive supervision.
A court could be more deferential to an agency's value choice that is ex-
pressly stated to reflect presidential preferences than one that is not. That
would encourage further executive supervision.! 1 However, just as with an
agency's value choice, one offered through executive supervision would still




Similarly, such a reason could not be a justification for slanting or ignoring
the results of a scientific or technical analysis. Beyond that, however, a
presidential preference for one of two regulatory options that otherwise are
each well supported on the facts, where the preferences are permissible con-
siderations under the terms of the statute, should receive deference.22°
By contrast, Watts suggests that judges would have to distinguish be-
tween a "real" political reason and one that is "raw politics," upholding a
decision based on the former, but not the latter. As she acknowledges,
"courts are not likely to be comfortable with this line-drawing task."22, De-
spite Watts's position, the key issue for a judge reviewing agency action in
which political reasons are disclosed ought to be whether all the considera-
tions offered in support of the agency action, political and nonpolitical, are
consistent with the requirements of the statute and meet basic requirements
of rationality-that the agency, for example, articulates a "'rational connec-
tion between the facts found and the choice made.' ,,21
215. Watts, supra note 12, at 82.
216. Id. at 83.
217. Influence from Congress is beyond the scope of this Article, though requiring disclosure
of such influence is worth considering.
218. This is Kagan's recommendation. See Kagan, supra note 11, at 2364.
219. See supra text accompanying notes 63-65 (discussing Massachusetts v. EPA).
220. It is an interesting question whether an express presidential preference to help a particu-
lar organized interest group could be a legitimate reason to overturn an agency decision. Again, the
answer would seem to depend on the characteristics of the particular statute at hand. Beyond statu-
tory requirements, the question of legitimacy is one that the electorate seems better suited to answer
than the judiciary.
221. Watts, supra note 12, at 83.
222. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n, Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43
(1983) (quoting Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 168 (1962)).
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In short, I suggest here that judicial review of reasons offered through
executive supervision should be deferential, within the confines of the au-
thorizing statute and the usual criteria that apply to scientific and technical
decisions rendered by agencies. Nonetheless, I am not advocating that judi-
cial review be hands off. Overly deferential review would raise other
concerns. In particular, agency activity could become less constrained by the• 223
rule of law. The argument would be that agencies might be tempted to
shroud their "real reasons" in politics, and once the agency invoked the
name of the President, the judiciary would be so deferential to this co-equal
branch of government that little meaningful review could be had.224
Even with judicial review that is deferential to political reasons dis-
closed through a regime such as the one I propose, agency decisions would
still be subject to effective judicial review. If anything, increased candor in
agency decisions might increase the meaningfulness of judicial review. First,
even with deferential treatment of political reasons, and even assuming, fol-
lowing Kagan, that the mere fact of "presidential leadership" can be a
reason in support of an agency decision, there are other aspects of an agency
decision that are clearly amenable to judicial review and that would not be
shielded from review because of newly disclosed information about execu-
tive preferences.22 The agency rule is still issued within bounds set by
226
Congress. The decision is highly likely to have other obviously reviewable
aspects, such as expert implementation of statutory requirements and the
resolution of legal issues. Return, for example, to the Clean Air Act and its
provisions requiring the EPA to set national ambient air quality standards
"requisite to protect the public health" with "an adequate margin of
safety.'2 27 Although "requisite" and "adequate" both implicate policy issues,
the standard still requires the agency to perform significant expert work
223. Watts argues that increased deference to political reasons could be a good thing because
it would offset excessively intrusive judicial review of agency decisions. Some have argued that
intrusive judicial review has caused ossification of agency rulemaking procedures. Watts, supra note
12, at 41-42. It is unclear, however, that judges would be deferring on the same sorts of issues on
which they were previously too intrusive. Technical issues, for example, would presumably continue
to be reviewed in the same manner.
224. Cf Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 166 (1803) ("[The Secretary of State]
... is to conform precisely to the will of the President.... The acts of such an officer, as an officer,
can never be examinable by the courts."), discussed in Peter L. Strauss, Legislation That Isn't-
Attending to Rulemaking's Democracy Deficit 98 CAL L. REV._(forthcoming 2010) (manuscript at
3-4), available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=1486221. As Kevin Stack has
observed, the extent to which reasons for a President's action should be subjected to judicial review
is a contested question. In his article seeking a constitutional basis for the Chenery requirement that
an agency decision be evaluated only on the basis of the reasons the agency itself has offered, Stack
reasons that although the President is "not immune from the constitutional principles that govern an
agency's exercise of delegated power," the "exceptionalism" of the President's status would "call
into question the basis for importing a constraint from the agency context." See Stack, supra note
27, at 1017-19.
225. See Kagan, supra note 11, at 2382.
226. Cf State Farm, 463 U.S. at 59 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("As long as the agency re-
mains within the bounds established by Congress, it is entitled to assess administrative records and
evaluate priorities in light of the philosophy of the administration.").
227. 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(1) (2006).
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relating to the health and safety issues presented by a particular air pollut-
ant. Even if a court were to treat value-laden reasons from the executive
branch highly deferentially, the legal- and expertise-laden aspects of the
decision should remain as susceptible to judicial review as before.
A risk remains that a particular issue could be characterized as a policy
or value issue rather than a technical or legal issue, and thereby receive
more deferential treatment in the courts. Drawing precise boundaries be-
tween these issues would be challenging, whether drawn by agencies or by
courts, but the risk that boundaries are improperly drawn is primarily a mar-
ginal risk. Some issues will clearly be more technical or legal, as opposed to
value-laden policy questions, and an agency is highly unlikely to be able to
immunize such issues from review by calling them political or policy issues.
Second, most cases of this sort will involve review of an agency's deci-
sion, not (directly) a decision of the President. Courts accordingly would be
less reluctant to review the decision, even if, there is some presidential in-
22volvement. For example, in Sierra Club v. Costle,28 the D.C. Circuit
considered arguments that political pressure (from Senator Byrd, in that
case) had tainted a Clean Air Act rule issued by the EPA. The court also re-
jected arguments that the rule violated the statute's procedural requirements
because intra-executive branch meetings between the President and EPA
officials were not docketed.229 Judge Wald, writing for the D.C. Circuit
panel, reaffirmed the rule announced in D.C. Federation of Civil Associa-
tions v. Volpe"3 that an agency decision would be overturned due to political
pressure only if the content of the pressure upon the agency is to force it to
decide on factors not made relevant by Congress in the authorizing statute
and the agency did so decide.23 The fair conclusion to be drawn is that even
if courts are deferential, they should at least be willing to inquire into the
content of political reasons considered by agencies to determine whether
232those reasons are consistent with the agency's authorizing statute. And in
Massachusetts v. EPA, the Court did not shy away from striking down, as
based on irrelevant factors, the EPA's decision not to make an endangerment
finding for greenhouse gases simply because the EPA referenced presiden-
233tial priorities in its decision.
Third, as Watts suggests, encouraging an agency to publicly disclose po-
litical reasons may make for more candid scientific and technical decision
making, instead of having those analyses skewed by buried political rea-
228. 657 F.2d 298 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
229. Id. at 387-91.
230. 459 F.2d 1231 (D.C. Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1030 (1972).
231. Id. at 1245-49.
232. See also EDLEY, supra note 10, at 176-77 n.12 (describing judicial and congressional
debate over "political interference").
233. 549 U.S. 497 (2007).
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234
sons. Judicial review of a more candid record is, in turn, likely to be more
meaningful.
In short, while it seems likely that judicial review will continue to be
meaningful even if agencies include political reasons and information about
executive supervision in rulemaking documents, all this will depend on the
precise review standard, whether defined by Congress or developed by the
courts in the absence of specific statutory instructions. At a minimum, courts
should review the content of political reasons to ensure that they are consis-
tent with an agency's authorizing statute and that they have not caused the
agency to skew expertise-based findings. Beyond that, courts ought to be
deferential to the content of the political reasons.
C. Political Reasons
By arguing for greater disclosure and discussion of an agency's political
reasons for a decision, such as those resulting from executive review, I do
not mean to suggest that all reasons coming from such a process are equally
legitimate. Again, by "political reasons" I mean reasons communicated from
a particular source, rather than reasons with a particular content. At this
juncture it is difficult to predict what might be encompassed in that class of
reasons. Such reasons could range from an articulation of core values ("we
must reduce workplace risks unless it is grossly, disproportionately costly to
do so") to seeking the support of key constituencies ("we must have the
support of Big Pharma") to simple political will ("the President wants this").
They could also include the views of technical and scientific experts em-
ployed, say, by OIRA. It is also difficult to render a complete array of
predictions regarding which reasons would be perceived as legitimate. I
have already suggested that a court should be relatively deferential to the
content of political reasons once the court confirms that the reasons are con-
sistent with an agency's authorizing statute and do not cause the agency to
disregard or slant factual findings. With respect to legitimacy from the per-
spective of other institutions, including Congress and the electorate, I want
to make just a few preliminary observations.
First, Mashaw suggests the illegitimacy of an administrative "retreat to
political will"-in other words, an agency saying, "The President told us to
do it. '235 Eskridge and Baer suggest that an agency decision would not be
any more justifiable if the agency cited polling numbers in support of its
decision. 216 Both of these might well be perceived as illegitimate by some
members of the electorate. But the Mashaw example, perhaps, does not
strike us as illegitimate because the President is involved. Instead, it seems
234. See Watts, supra note 12, at 13 ("[Eincouraging agencies to dislose political factors
could help to take some of the pressure off of science, creating a more effective separation between
science and politics.").
235. See supra text accompanying note 61.
236. See supra text accompanying note 60.
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illegitimate because it does not seem to be much of a reason at all."' Saying,
"The President said so," seems arbitrary because it does not identify any
more general principle that might explain the choice made either within the
agency or within the executive review process.238
Return to the Office of Surface Mining's interpretation of the limitation
on "surface mining operations" within national park boundaries or within
300 feet of a house. Suppose the agency reported, "During executive review,
the OMB and OIRA indicated that presidential policy preferences favor an
interpretation that maintains the long-term economic viability of the long-
wall coal mining industry. The ability under other statutory provisions to
address environmental risks will be adequate to address major subsidence
concerns." Or perhaps the agency might have reported, "This interpretation
serves the goal of maintaining the economic viability of the longwall coal-
mining industry. It is consistent with the President's preferences." The rea-
son for this policy decision seems more legitimate, perhaps, because the
agency has offered a more detailed, less apparently arbitrary explanation,
which also discloses the White House's involvement in the finally arrived-at
reasons. Or, to return to the seatbelt example, the DOT might have said, "We
are required to regulate 'unreasonable' risks from motor vehicle operation.
Our view is that when individuals can minimize their own risks by buckling
their already-available seatbelts, the risks cannot be deemed 'unreasonable.'
As executive review has confirmed, that position is consistent with presiden-
tial policy preferences." These, too, are political reasons, but more
legitimate-at least, I would argue they are-because they are less arbitrary
than "The President said so."
Similarly, courts have usually treated deferentially-and as legitimate-
an agency's expression of certain concerns viewed as "peculiarly within [the
agency's] expertise," in the words of Heckler v. Chaney.2'9 That opinion
discussed factors an agency often considers in deciding whether to enforce a
particular statutory regime:
[T]he agency must not only assess whether a violation has occurred, but
whether agency resources are best spent on this violation or another,
whether the agency is likely to succeed if it acts, whether the particular en-
forcement action requested best fits the agency's overall policies, and,
indeed, whether the agency has enough resources to undertake the action at
all.'40
It seems likely that an agency's reasons relating to resource allocation
and prioritization, including those reflecting executive preferences, ought to
237. For nonadherents to the unitary executive theory, relying on such a presidential statement
seems illegitimate because it appears that the President has gone beyond influencing or supervising
the agency's decision and made the decision in lieu of the agency.
238. E.g., Frederick Schauer, Giving Reasons, 47 STAN. L. Rv. 633, 635 (1995) ("The act of
giving a reason... is an exercise in generalization.").
239. 470 U.S. 821, 831 (1985).
240. Id.
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be treated as legitimate, especially if they appear to be articulated and ap-
plied more or less consistently.
What about the polling-data example? That surely could also be a politi-
cal reason, if the White House told an agency, say, "We want you to pick
this option because it is consistent with the public's views as expressed in
this poll." Such a reason might well be legitimate if one thought that the
administrative state should operate simply to realize majoritarian prefer-
ences. One might also imagine, however, that just as with a presidential
candidate accused of "pandering, 24' executive review consistently aimed at
the goal of responding to polling data might also be viewed not as legiti-
242mate, but as poor leadership.
The question of which political reasons should qualify as legitimate does
not need to be-and indeed, should not be-definitively resolved at this
point. A more transparent system would have the advantage of prompting
debate on these questions. More disclosure would enable the public to react
to political reasons and to better register its views on which ones are suffi-
cient to justify a particular agency decision. As then-Professor Scalia wrote
regarding such political judgments, "the retribution or reward ... will be
meted out by Congress, or at the polls, but not in the courts. 243
Relatedly, it is possible that greater transparency may reveal something
else about executive review that might help us evaluate its validity. It may
turn out that executive review is not primarily focused on the value-laden
policy issues, but instead amounts to reviewing and second-guessing an
agency's more technical or scientific conclusions. If a more transparent
process reveals this to be the primary function of executive review, then we
might start to see executive review as less legitimate to the extent it operates
to skew or displace the expertise that has long resided within the agencies.
24
CONCLUSION
It is worth contrasting the views articulated here with the D.C. Circuit's
241influential decision in Sierra Club v. Costle. In that case, the D.C. Circuit
declined to apply the Clean Air Act's docketing requirement to post-
comment period communications directly between the President and the
EPA. The court acknowledged that "undisclosed presidential prodding"
might drive a result different from the choice the agency might have made in
241. Cf Editorial, Unworthy Pandering by Mr. Gore, N.Y TIMES, Sept. 12, 2000, at A26.
242. Cf THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison) ("When a majority is included in a faction,
the form of popular government on the other hand enables it to sacrifice to its ruling passion or
interest, both the public good and the rights of other citizens.").
243. See Antonin Scalia, Chairman's Message: Rulemaking as Politics, 34 ADMIN. L. REV.
xxv, xxxi (1982).
244. An agency decision can, of course, contain errors, and identifying them in the executive
review process seems more than appropriate. But if the executive review process seems, overall,
aimed at redirecting the expertise of the agencies or creating a new research agenda for them, then
we might rethink whether that is an appropriate displacement of agency authority.
245. 657 F.2d 298 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
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its absence. But, in rejecting the docketing requirement, the court stated,
"[W]e do not believe that Congress intended that the courts convert informal
rulemaking into a rarefied technocratic process, unaffected by political con-
siderations or the presence of Presidential power.
246
About this, however, the Sierra Club court may be wrong. Seeking
greater disclosure of the content of executive influence will not convert
agency decision making into a technocratic process.47 That influence is here
to stay-and many now view it as a necessary component of administrative
legitimacy. Disclosing more information regarding executive influence is
likely to make agency decisions more candid and to increase the political
accountability of the administrative state for decisions that are inevitably
value-laden. Further, having agencies disclose the reasons of White House
actors in their decision documents is likely to help ensure that political
power is more appropriately and responsibly exercised.
The other lingering possibility, however, is that it may be time to revisit
presidential supervision as a basis for the legitimacy of the administrative
state. The potential taint that some perceive coming from presidential fin-
gers in the regulatory pie may be a signal that submerged presidential
supervision may, on balance, undermine, rather than reinforce, the legiti-
macy of agency decisions. Greater transparency in executive control might
confirm that view if, for example, executive oversight turns out generally to
be motivated by clearly improper political considerations or aimed, not at
policy or value issues, but at manipulating technical or scientific conclusions
when agency officials possess superior expertise. Meanwhile, the continuing
absence of transparent political explanations for an agency's balance be-
tween safety and cost, or choice of "reasonable risk," might also suggest
that, electoral accountability notwithstanding, we might rather have our1.• • 248"experts" make our value choices for us than our politicians. To the extent
the politicians are making these calls, however, that still needs to be more in
the public eye than it currently is.
246. Id. at 408. The court also indicated that it wished not to require disclosure in order to
avoid any Article II considerations that might be raised by requiring disclosure when the "President
himself is directly involved in oral communications." Id. at 407.
247. As Bagley and Revesz have discussed, political factors can play a role within the agen-
cies as well as without. Bagley & Revesz, supra note 47.
248. Cf Harter, supra ntte 173, at 559 ("[A major New Deal theory] contends that techno-
cratic experts are best suited to make regulatory decisions because those experts are able to reach
the 'right' or 'correct' answer if left alone to exercise their professional judgment.").
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